THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

It is just two years ago since we entered an earnest plea in this Journal for the initiation of a serious effort to face the differences of doctrine at present existing in the Church of England, with a view to clearing the issues and, if possible, reaching agreement. The proposal was not our own: it was in the air; and the progress of thought in the Anglo-Catholic and Modernist parties, together with the Reunion movement then flowing strong under the impulse of the Lambeth Conference, seemed to make the matter urgent. It is naturally, therefore, with very great satisfaction that we record to-day, as the outcome of conferences presided over by the Bishop of Oxford, the appointment by the Archbishops of a Doctrinal Commission. We shall hope next month to publish in full the documents bearing upon this event.

Almost exactly a century and a half ago a similar movement was afoot to grapple with controversial issues in our Communion. It is best described in the words of its chief mover, Dr. Beilby Porteous, afterwards Bishop of Chester, and later of London:

> At the close of the year 1772, and the beginning of the next, an attempt was made by myself, and a few other clergymen, among whom were Mr. Francis Wollaston, Dr. Percy, now Bishop of Dromore, and Dr. Yorke, now Bishop of Ely, to induce the bishops to promote a review of the Liturgy and Articles; in order to amend in both, but particularly in the latter, those parts which all reasonable persons agreed stood in need of amendment. This plan was meant to strengthen and confirm the ecclesiastical establishment; to repel the attacks which were at that time continually made upon it by its avowed enemies; to render the 17th Article on Predestination and Election more clear and perspicuous, and less liable to be wrested by our adversaries to a Calvinistic sense, which has been so unjustly affixed to it. . . . On these grounds we applied in a private and respectful manner to Archbishop Cornwallis, requesting him to signify our wishes (which we conceived to be the wishes of a very large proportion both of the clergy and laity) to the

rest of the bishops, that everything might be done which could be prudently and safely done to promote these important and salutary purposes. . . . The answer given by the Archbishop, February 11, 1773, was in these words: "I have consulted severally my brethren the bishops, and it is the opinion of the Bench in general that nothing can in prudence be done in the matter which has been submitted to our consideration" (*Works of Bishop Porteous*, I. 38).

Few will deny that the problem then envisaged is to-day both larger and more urgent. It is also more hopeful. The rise of the Critical movement, in close concurrence with evolutionary thought and the progress of Comparative Religion and Psychology, has given a new intellectual setting to Christian doctrine; and it is reasonable to hope that new positive factors may thus be disclosed which will open the way to constructive reconciliation. Moreover, the great expansion of the Church's life, marked by the recovery of missionary zeal and of Catholic devotion, means that a much wider area of experience will be under review, and will claim doctrinal expression, than could have been the case in the eighteenth century. The task, we may be sure, will be a long one: quick results, indeed, are not to be either expected or desired; and meanwhile we shall pray that the progress of its discussions may be marked by an ever clearer intuition of the mind of Christ and His Church.

The Session of the National Assembly which closed early last month must have filled many of its members with a growing confidence in its future utility. Financial difficulties, so prominent hitherto, were hardly discussed; Prayer-Book Revision was handed over to the constituent Houses, where it can be much more profitably handled; and the Assembly devoted itself to its proper work of preparing legislative measures. In the measures dealing with Union of Benefices, with Dilapidations and Clergy Pensions, and with the division of Dioceses, solid instalments of Church Reform were put forward and were advanced a further stage; though it looks as though the Winchester division scheme would be considerably modified in committee. A debate of great interest took place on the Church's attitude to social and industrial questions, and we are glad that the broader view prevailed. Cobbett's reply to the charge of confusing religion and politics would not have been amiss. "Sir," he said, "how can I do otherwise, seeing that I belong to a Church whose creed is part of an Act of Parliament?"

THE ABIDING CAUSE OF THE DESERTION OF JESUS CHRIST

THOSE who read attentively the Gospel narratives of the life of Jesus discover a time of crisis which divides His earthly ministry into two clearly marked periods. In the former, Jesus was followed by admiring crowds; and in the latter, men became definitely hostile to Him. The event is thus recorded by St. John: "From this time many of His disciples went back, and walked no more with Him" (John vi. 66).

On the side of those who became definitely hostile the effect is thus described: "After these things Jesus walked in Galilee, for He would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill Him" (John vii. 1).

This combined desertion and hostility must be understood by all who wish to read the Gospels intelligently, and the causes which led to these are to-day as ever determining the relation of many thousands in the Christian Church to the person and being of Christ, and are causing the same desertion and hostility which stand out so prominently in the records of our Lord's earthly life.

The turning-point in the life of Jesus is, therefore, of supreme importance in understanding the Gospel records, and demands that we should inquire the causes which produced so great changes in men's hearts.

In the early part of our Lord's ministry, even from the day when He began to teach, He was attended by devotion and enthusiasm. Crowds attended Him everywhere, in so much that they trode one upon another in their anxiety to be near Him. His gracious words and mighty deeds attracted the multitudes, who declared that never man spake like this man. When the Sermon on the Mount was delivered, Jesus withdrew from the multitudes, and His disciples came to Him. Men saw or heard with wonder the cure of one possessed of a devil, the healing of Simon Peter's mother-in-law, the stilling of the tempest on the sea, and the raising from death of the daughter of Jairus.

It is true that amid this universal enthusiasm signs of opposition began to arise. The Pharisees raised the question of His breach of the Sabbath, but the first definite hostile demonstration arose at Nazareth amongst His own countrymen. This was caused by the question who He was. The people were astonished, and asked, "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works?" They thought they knew His

history and origin. "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not His mother called Mary? and His brethren James and Joses, and Simon and Judas? and His sisters, are they not with us? Whence, then, hath this man all these things? And they were offended at Him" (Matt. xiii. 54-57).

Any testimony to His divine origin was so far confined to the demoniacs whom He cured, and this testimony He refused to use. In the synagogue at Capernaum such an one declared: "I know Thee who Thou art, the Holy One of God." A second incident in the same city raised the question of His being. To one sick of the palsy Jesus says: "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee." To which the Scribes sitting there objected by saying: "Why doth this man thus speak blasphemies? who can forgive sins but God only?" All are amazed. They glorify God and are filled with fear, saying, "We have seen strange things to-day."

Rumour, which had long been busy with His person and origin, had formulated different reports. He was Elijah or one of the prophets. Some, like Herod, hailed Him as John the Baptist risen from the dead; others, like the multitude on the lakeside, wished to take Him by force and make Him a king.

The Jews at Capernaum said: "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?"

These and like rumours expressed the popular conceptions. If narrow and earthly, they were at least natural, and in the absence of more definite declarations from His own lips the only possible conclusions.

Such was the condition of public opinion when Jesus Himself in the synagogue at Capernaum raised anew the question of His own origin and being, and brought about by His declarations the conflict which never ended until His enemies had secured His condemnation before the High Priest. In this trial the issue was raised with all solemnity. The High Priest, rising from his seat, administered an oath, saying: "I adjure Thee by the living God that Thou tell us whether Thou be the Christ, the Son of God." And Jesus said: "Thou hast said. I am." Then the High Priest rent his clothes in horror at the supposed blasphemy, and said: "What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned Him to be guilty of death."

As we proceed to examine the words spoken at Capernaum, it is important to remember that Jesus Himself raised the question of His origin. He who had forbidden the demoniacs to bear witness to Him, at His own time and in His own way challenged His disciples and His enemies to accept Him and His divine power, or to reject Him. We cannot regard the

claims of Christ to divine origin as the result of the devotion of His followers. Whilst they discussed the question, What think ye of the Christ? He settled it by His own words. These words are still the justification of the attitude of His adoring and worshipping Church, as they are the cause of offence to thousands of nominal Christians.

We take these words in St. John vi. to refer to something wider than the Sacrament of Holy Communion: to be a general statement of His origin and nature defining His relationship to the whole human race. The Eucharist subsequently instituted is in exact accordance with them, and is a corporate act of divine worship whereby the Church and each member of it can appropriate one part of their meaning. It is a definite and prescribed act of feeding upon Christ, but it does not exhaust the full meaning of the larger relationship nor include all which is expressed in the words at Capernaum.

By whatever act of faith and obedience the soul which is athirst for God draws near to the divine presence, whenever the wants and cravings of our spiritual nature, all the hunger and thirst of the soul, seek for their satisfaction in Christ, we are realizing this feeding upon Him.

He that cometh to Me in prayer and desire, in reverence and adoration, he who lifts up his soul to God, shall be filled and satisfied. Receiving Christ by faith includes any way of communicating with His body and blood, whether by baptism, by holy desires, by obedience, by love, and by worthy receiving of the Holy Sacrament. "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life."

This language of our Lord about eating His flesh and drinking His blood is plainly sacrificial in its imagery.

In Jewish sacrifices the blood which was the life was never consumed, but always rejected as food. The startling nature of our Lord's words is found in the altogether new declaration that His flesh and blood—*i.e.*, His very life and spirit—are now to be given for the healing of the nations and for the spiritual feeding of all souls.

No wonder the hearers were amazed; nor is it any surprise to us to learn that many disciples went back and walked no more with Him. His declaration, so transcending all previous conceptions and so opposed to the teaching of Jewish sacrifices, could not be accepted when men heard it for the first time. The language, like so many other utterances of our Lord, was challenging in its abruptness. Its justification is to be found in that He was Himself to interpret the meaning of all sacrifices in His death upon the cross, when He offered Himself as a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the whole world.

By that sacrifice new grace and power were provided to feed the hunger and to quench the thirst of human souls.

The men of Capernaum understood Christ to speak the words of His natural flesh and blood, and were rightly scandalized at them. "How can this man give us His flesh to eat?"

Our Lord reproved their folly in thus interpreting His words by telling them they were to be understood in a spiritual sense. "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life" (John vi. 63).

The testimony of the Christian Fathers to warrant the spiritual sense of the words as against the natural is universal. Those who wish to verify this statement will find proofs of it in Jeremy Taylor's *The Presence Real and Spiritual of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament,* vol. ix., pp. 421-512 (Heber's edition).

They will also find in the same pages a protest against limiting the words spoken in the synagogue at Capernaum to the Eucharist only, and an illustration in support of this from Bellarmine: "It is known that the Eucharist is not handled in the whole chapter (John vi.), for Christ therefore discourses of natural bread. The miracle of the loaves, of faith, and of the incarnation, are a great part of the chapter."

We are chiefly concerned at present to mark the effect of this teaching upon the minds of the hearers. Amongst the Jews it aroused a permanent and resolute hostility. Henceforth they sought to kill Him. Amongst His disciples, after a protest expressed in the words, "This is a hard saying; who can bear it?" it led to desertion. "From that time many of His disciples went back, and walked no more with Him." Thus it was that, when our Lord, not contented with the homage of discipleship which venerated His person and reverently listened to His words, proclaimed His divine origin as the "bread of God which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world," His disciples were offended. He left them no longer any choice in their speculations about Him. Brushing aside every local jealousy and every wild speculation about His origin, He presented Himself as sent by God the Father. "This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent" (John vi. 29). "This is the will of Him that sent Me, that everyone which seeth the Son and believeth on Him may have everlasting life" (John vi. 40).

His disciples had never heard from Him language such as this before. The first presentation of Christ as of divine origin created a revulsion of feeling, as an impossible claim. Here, they thought, was a good man gone mad. Not the loyalty and

veneration of many days was sufficient to cause them to accept the claim; many walked no more with Him.

From the decision of this unbelieving multitude, which went away because it had neither the faith to remain nor the confidence to wait for more light and instruction, our Lord appeals to the Twelve. You who have journeyed so long with Me, whom I have loved and taught, who have heard Me in words and seen Me in my deeds, "will ye also go away?" It is the appeal of a wounded heart. The answer to it came from the lips of St. Peter, the man of prompt decision and ready speech, who by his natural gifts was accepted as the spokesman of the Apostles. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life, and we believe and are sure that Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (John vi. 68, 69).

These words imply confidence and faith. If the Apostles did not comprehend their full import, they are at least the expression of an abiding faith which dare not be offended. The human heart and mind are thus always led from faith to greater faith by not being faithless, but believing. The ground of the assurance is: "Thou hast the words of eternal life."

It will be remembered that a little later Jesus raised the same question with His Apostles, and when St. Peter, again the spokesman for the rest, replied in like words, He added: "Blessed are thou, Simon Bar-Jonah, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 17).

What think ye of Christ? is the greatest question in the Church and in the world to-day. We cannot escape an ultimate conclusion, though so many hover in their decision. Possibly only the few in the Church to-day are fully with the Apostles in their unconditioned faith. To this few the appeal of Jesus goes forth unceasingly. Through them belief in the divine nature of our Saviour is handed on from age to age in the Church. The appeal from the deserting multitude to the faithful is being perpetually re-enacted. Behind every question of Church life and work this stands in its grandeur and commanding power. We must settle it for ourselves, and then arrange ourselves either amongst the deserters or the hostile, or rest with those of His believing Church who continually offer to Him the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, and worship Him as God who has declared our heavenly Father to us and made Him manifest in human life. "Thou art the King of glory, O Christ; Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father."

About the middle of the eighteenth century Whiston, in summing up Dr. Waterland's defence of the Christian Creeds, spoke of him as "one of the most learned (and he is willing to

hope the last learned) supporters of the Athanasian heresy." And yet in the nineteenth century Dr. Liddon, in his Bampton Lectures, with equal learning defended the divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, showing in Lecture IV. that the Church's faith rests most securely upon Christ's own words about Himself. "Eternal Jesus! it is Thyself who hast thus bidden us either to despise Thee or worship Thee. . . . If our ears hearken to Thy revelations of Thy greatness, our souls have already been won to Thee by Thy truthfulness, by Thy lowliness, and by Thy love. Convinced by these Thy moral glories and by Thy majestic exercise of creative and healing power, we believe and are sure Thou hast the words of eternal life."

Signs are not wanting that in the near future Christian controversy will centre round the same great article of the Christian Creed. Dr. Bethune Baker has said lately at Cambridge that the old orthodoxy is now in ruins. What he means we do not now inquire, using his words only to illustrate our statement that controversy is gathering its forces for a new consideration of the claims of Jesus Christ.

Biblical criticism has largely done its work, and has left us with a Bible more real and living than the one which we reverenced with a devoted yet blind zeal. The ritual controversy has to a great extent burnt itself out, and men look with languid interest upon the matters touching public worship which roused the fierce ire of our fathers.

At the present time the energy of Church life is being consumed by questions of government and administration, and by a restless desire to make the Church a living factor in social life. Behind all these transitory phases of Church energy there is emerging a desire to go back to fundamentals, to the authority of Christ, and this always means to His origin and being.

And so once again the chief question for all Chritians teachers will be, What think ye of Christ? Are we prepared for the contest, and are we equipping ourselves to defend our faith, because in it we find the words of eternal life and the Son of the living God?

Once our feet are planted firmly on this rock, on which the Church of the living God is built, we can watch unmoved the tumultuous waves of this troublesome world as they surge around us. Without this foundation we are exposed to either desertion as disciples or hostility as enemies.

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CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN CHINA

The Report of the China Educational Commission of 1921–1922.

The report of the China Educational Commission is a document of the utmost importance. By it missionary educational policy is certain to be guided. It is full of wise counsel on the need for co-operation, and for a Chinese rather than a foreign atmosphere. I wish to begin by emphasizing the great value of this report on these and many other grounds which I have not here space to particularize before I venture on any criticism. If missionary societies engage in the kind of education with which this report deals, the report itself is of the very highest value. But the commissioners have done more than this. There are certain fundamental questions on which every man who wishes to support mission educational work intelligently must form an opinion, and these fundamental questions are here frankly stated and frankly answered. All men who try to understand foreign missions ought to be thankful to the commisisoners for stating them and answering them, because only too often in missionary reports questions like these are not faced, answers to them are taken for granted, and an elaborate superstructure is built on an unstated, undefined foundation. These questions are: (1) What is Christian education ? (p. 10); (2) What is the aim of the missionary enterprise ? (p. 29); and (3) What is the place of education in the missionary enterprise ? (p. 30). It is with the commissioners' answers to these questions alone that I wish to deal here.

1. What is Christian education ? In the words of this report it is " education which is controlled by Christian men or women, is conducted from a Christian motive, and aims to impart to those who receive it the knowledge and training which will most contribute to worthy living, individual and social, and especially to generate in them that Christian spirit which is its own governing motive " (p. 11).

Now here it will be seen at once that Christian education is defined as Christian wholely and solely from the side of the person who gives it; the educand, or pupil, is not mentioned as having anything to do with the Christian character of the education. That omission is very serious. Can a Christian education be given unless the pupil is ready to receive a Christian education ? Is his attitude, whether friendly or hostile, to the Christian element in the education a matter of no importance ? Suppose that a Christian man is charged with the education of

the son of a determined Hindu, or Buddhist, or Agnostic. The pupil's attitude to the teaching of his master quâ teacher of knowledge useful and profitable from his own point of view, such as mathematics or engineering, is friendly; he is ready to receive all that he can learn: his attitude to his master quâ Christian is frankly indifferent, contemptuous, or hostile; he is not ready to learn to become a Christian. Does that not make a difference? Can he be said to receive a Christian education? And if he does not receive a Christian education, can the education be properly called Christian simply on the ground that it is given by a Christian? Does the religion and motive of the teacher solely by itself make education Christian, or moral, or anything else, regardless of the attitude and receptiveness of the pupil? I know, of course, that in common speech we often speak loosely as if that were the case; but when we are speaking exactly, is that language defensible? Surely education is something not only given, but received; surely both pupil and teacher have a share in it. Education is a process to which both teacher and pupil have a contribution to make, and any definition which omits the contribution of the pupil seems to be deficient. This is peculiarly true of religious education, in which the attitude of the pupil is of the very highest importance. But this one-sided definition is essential if the commissioners are to maintain, as they do, the ground that missionary societies ought to provide education for pupils who are not Christians, and have no intention of learning to become Christians. A great many Christians will protest against this. They will say that Christian education is the education of Christians, and necessarily demands a willingness on the part of the pupil to learn to become, and to be, a Christian. They will say that without that willingness a pupil may receive instruction from Christian teachers, but that there can be no Christian education.

2. What is the aim of the missionary enterprise? The commissioners say that "the modern missionary movement includes within itself various types of work which may be characterized as evangelism, by which the Christian message is announced and converts won; edification, by which there is built up a Church with competent leadership; philanthropy, which seeks to relieve suffering; and the permeation of the non-Christian community with Christian ideas."

Such a statement is not a great assistance to us in discovering the answer to the question, What is the aim of the missionary enterprise? because it presents us with a number of different objects, each of which may be called an aim; and a movement which admits a number of aims is always on the

verge of distraction. But what is of far greater importance is that the aims presented to us are not coherent in themselves. There is a point of cleavage which is of such a profound character that no power will long hold together the aims which lie on the one side with those which lie on the other side of it, and this point of cleavage the commissioners do not perceive. The point of cleavage lies in a difference of relation to Christ.

Take, for instance, the aim expressed as an attempt to permeate non-Christian society with Christian ideas. That aim presupposes (*a*) that there are Christian ideas which can be accepted by non-Christians; (*b*) that those Christian ideas continue to be Christian when held by non-Christians; (*c*) that it is a proper aim for a Christian missionary society to permeate non-Christian society with those ideas.

All these three presuppositions many Christians will stoutly deny. (*a*) They will say that if there are "Christian ideas" which can be accepted by non-Christians without the non-Christians becoming Christians, that mere fact proves at once that the ideas are not in their nature peculiarly Christian. If they can be held by Christians and non-Christians, they must necessarily belong to that large class of religious ideas which are not the peculiar property of any one religion; and therefore it is absurd to call them "Christian ideas," as if they were the peculiar property of Christians. It may be true that they grew up mainly amongst Christians and were learned by Christians from Christ, but that does not rob them of their common quality. Christ expressed many ideas which are common to religious men, but those are not the Christian Gospel.

(*b*) They will say that if there are "Christian ideas" which can be received by non-Christians, those Christian ideas cease to be Christian when held by non-Christians. Ideas which for Christians are Christian ideas, for non-Christians are not Christian ideas. Ideas are not to be divorced from the mind which entertains them. They change their character in different minds and in different associations. For instance, an idea like the Fatherhood of God is a Christian idea for Christians, because it is associated with the idea of the Divine Son and of adoption in the Son. Permeate non-Christian society with that idea, and what happens? It is not associated with the Divine Son, nor with adoption in the Son: it is associated with, let us say, pantheistic ideas of the great pervading, all life-giving Spirit or Essence. Is it then the same idea? The non-Christian uses language about the Fatherhood of God which sounds familiar to the Christian, and the Christian rejoices to hear "Christian ideas" in the mouth of a non-Christian; but are they really Christian ideas? To the hearer they are,

but not to the speaker. None but a Christian can entertain Christian ideas. Divorced from faith in Christ, they cease to be Christian.

(*c*) They will say that it is not at all the duty of a Christian missionary society to propagate Christian ideas which can be, and are, divorced from Christ. It is the duty of a Christian missionary society to bring men to Christ, that all their ideas may be made Christian by association with Christ. They will say that this idea of permeating a non-Christian society which remains non-Christian with Christian ideas is itself non-Christian. They will say that the only true way to permeate non-Christian society with Christian ideas is to permeate it with Christian men. They will say that Christian missionaries cannot divorce Christian ideas from Christ.

There is really no agreement between those who aim at permeating non-Christian society with Christian ideas divorced from Christ, and those who aim at bringing men to Christ as the only way by which they may entertain Christian ideas. The gulf is fixed between them, and sooner or later they must realize that it is there.

The same argument applies to the philanthropic aims. There is a gulf between those who think that a missionary society should engage in any philanthropic work because it is philanthropic, and those who hold that philanthropy can be as easily divorced from Christ as " Christian ideas " can be divorced from Christ, and that philanthropic work simply as philanthropic is not the work of a missionary society.

The commissioners present us not with a missionary aim, but a multitude of aims. Hence arise the distraction and confusion in our present missionary work. We see missionaries striving after every sort of object, following any scheme which seems to make for human welfare, and the commissioners assert that this is so and should be so; but many supporters of missions are beginning to feel the futility of this restless activity which aims at every good thing. They long after some unity of aim. They are tired of dealing with multitudes of secondary causes; they want to find again the prime cause. They are seeking eagerly for some one dominant object which will unify and control all these multifarious activities. The commissioners present us with the idea of a missionary society as a collection of men moved by several motives, loosely associated together to do any sort of philanthropic work, evangelization among the rest. Missionary societies, as the commissioners acknowledge, did not start like that; and it is certain that they will not long continue like that. Men who believe that the missionary motive is one, not many, and that the missionary aim is single, not

plural, men who believe that all the resources of the societies can hardly suffice to accomplish the one supreme object, will not long tolerate the confusion and distraction which result from the divided motive and the divided aim. They must unify their thought and their activity; for they can find no rest in a host of Christian ideas, one of which may be the Saviour, or in a multifarious Christian philanthropy, in which somewhere place must be found for the salvation of souls. Nothing can deliver us but the recognition that the missionary motive is one, because Christ is one, and the missionary aim is one, because Christ is one. The one missionary motive is the love of Christ for the souls of men; the one missionary aim is to bring men to enter into fellowship. Everything that is done, all means, all methods, must be controlled by that one aim, and directed absolutely to that one end, and no secondary aim must be allowed to distract our attention for one moment from it. Then we shall once more have a single eye, and, with a single eye, light.

3. What is the place of education in the missionary enterprise? Starting with plural motives and plural aims, it is certain that the place of education in the missionary enterprise cannot be defined in terms of unity. And so it is here: "Because education is the only remedy for *some of the ills* with which society is afflicted, and is an important factor in practically *every department of activity* which makes *either for the spread of the Christian religion or the promotion of human welfare*, education also has been in purpose evangelistic, edificatory, permeative, and philanthropic" (p. 35). "It is essential to the maintenance of the Christian point of view that it be recognized that *whatever pertains to human welfare* and is achievable through education is in principle within the scope of missionary education" (p. 35). The principle laid down is that "nothing that makes for the welfare of a people can be a matter of indifference" to a Christian. No doubt it cannot be a matter of indifference; but does it then follow that a Christian missionary society must aim directly at the alleviation of every ill? Does it follow that St. Paul and the early missionaries were indifferent to all the social evils which they saw in the Roman Empire because they did not attack them directly? If it does, then the commissioners are perfectly right in maintaining that missionary societies, so far as their resources will go, should engage in every kind of education. But if it does not, then their enunciation of the principle is misleading and their application of it false. To decline to deal directly with every form of weakness and ignorance is not to be indifferent to them. If the best way to deal with them is to bring men to the source of all spiritual and moral enlightenment, then to adhere closely to that one

aim is by no means to show indifference to the need of men for specialized education.

Here that distraction and confusion which appeared in the want of definition of the missionary aim enters into the educational department of missionary work, and leads the societies to do a little at everything that they may not appear to be indifferent to anything. If they have one motive and one aim, and that a strictly religious and Christian aim, then education, so far as they take part in it directly, ought to be strictly religious, Christian education, and no teaching should be given to anyone who does not receive it Christianly, that he may learn to serve Christ.

Here I must say one word by the way to guard against misapprehension. We are hearing now constantly the words "proselytize," "proselytism," "proselyte," used in missionary circles; and I would have no one imagine that I desire that missionary societies should become (they are already far too much) proselytizing agencies. To proselytize is to attempt to bring a man over from one system of thought and practice to another; to convert is to bring a man into relation with Christ. The Jews moved heaven and earth to make a proselyte, and so sometimes do we; but that is not the true work of a missionary of Christ. To set proselytism before us as the aim of our work, to introduce Christianity as a system of moral and religious thought, to convert men to that system as a system, is to do precisely what the Jews did and what Christ condemned. Men are not to be saved by adopting any code of morals or religion, but by Christ. To set ourselves then to inculcate any such system as a system is inevitably to fall into most serious error, and in education to make schools for children hotbeds of proselytism is pernicious. Christian education is for Christians, and that education is the work of a *missionary* society. This is not to say that mission education must be solely designed to produce mission agents. Mission agents are anathema: the very term is a disgrace to "servants of Christ." Mission education ought to be designed to produce Christians instructed in Christ. That is quite a different thing. That aim, if it is kept always clear and definite, at once disperses the mists of the distracted and divided aims presented to us by the commissioners, and perhaps cuts at the root of many of their recommendations. But that is another question. Only of one thing I am certain: unless we put education into this relation to Christ and give it a place in the missionary enterprise solely on this basis, we shall never carry it far, or accomplish the purpose for which the great majority of Christian people still support foreign missions.

ROLAND ALLEN.

MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION

THE object of this article is twofold—briefly to consider the distinction between meditation and contemplation; and, secondly, to offer some suggestions on prayer in general.

Following the best writers, Baron von Hügel distinguishes between meditation and contemplation by saying that "meditation is the ordinary foundation of the interior life, and the ordinary prayer of beginners, whose imperfect love requires to be excited and sustained by distinct and reflective acts. Contemplation is called by the mystical saints 'a loving look,' as discriminating it from meditation and the latter's many methodic and discursive acts, and as limiting it to a simple and loving consideration and view of God and divine things, certified and rendered present to the soul by faith. It is the ordinary prayer of perfect souls, or, at least, of those that have already made much progress in the divine love. For the more purely a soul loves God, the less it requires to be sustained by distinct reflective acts, reasoning becomes a fatigue and an embarrassment to it in its prayer—it longs but to love and to contemplate the object of its love." Baron von Hügel goes on further to show that without contemplation the soul may arrive at a very high perfection, and that the most discursive meditation may contain the beginnings of contemplation.

Broadly, then, meditation is a process of reasoning and reflection in which results are obtained through a series of distinct steps, each logically depending on those which precede. In other words, it is a method or theory or system of prayer; a methodology of spirit, in which the emphasis is laid mainly on ratiocination and the understanding, as distinct from the higher and larger movements of the intellect. It is, also, almost wholly conscious, conative, exertive, effortful, and deliberate—*i.e.*, it is mainly occupied with the theoretical active element of consciousness, showing itself in tendencies, impulses, desires, and acts of volition, each of these being accompanied by a sense of endeavour, striving, and conscious purposefulness; whence the resolutions made in meditation are often consciously ethical and prudential. In the main, therefore, meditation belongs to the quantitative and petitionary side of prayer, and corresponds to the second part of the Lord's Prayer: "Give us . . . forgive us . . . lead us not . . . deliver us."

No doubt, because of our creation and "creatureliness," all Christian prayer is *ipso facto* petitionary and deprecatory, and here it is unlike much modern prayer, which, claiming to

be unitive, is really pantheistic. But the more moralization and love increase, the more do they pass from the quantitative and particular to the qualitative and universal; the more do they become an "attitude," a "point of view," a "disposition," an "ethology," in which the mere reasoning or "thinking out" of a subject—and, therefore, language itself as employed in this "thinking out"—is recognized to be partial and inadequate before the vision of the Whole and the Fulness and Livingness of Being and Personality, as distinct from the abstractions of Thought and Intellect. The petitionary nature of prayer is then subsumed under the forms of adoration, wonder, "beholding," praise, thanksgiving; the "otherness" and *nuances* of Being, which are deeper and richer than those of mind. In contradistinction, then, to Meditation, Contemplation thus expresses and corresponds to the first part of the Lord's Prayer ("Our Father, Which art in heaven [Being], Hallowed be Thy Name" [point of view, "name," in Semitics, often standing for "character, authority, ownership"]), as well as to the doxology ("For Thine is the kingdom"). It is, also, in keeping with what may be called the "ascending scale" of prayer in the New Testament, where quantitative prayer ("Ask, and ye shall receive") leads to qualitative prayer ("Ask in My Name"), and this in turn to contemplative or unitive prayer ("Behold, I stand at the door and knock"), where Christ and the soul both wait and listen till He enters, this last verse having all the characteristics of listening, silent, wordless, illuminative, and unitive mystic prayer.

It is true that meditation and contemplation have much in common. All forms of prayer interpenetrate, just because man is not a series of water-tight compartments. Kant's water-tight faculty psychology is dead. The fear—right in degree—the English Church has of systematized prayer is partly due to the dominance in England of Kantian teaching. Man is a *continuum*, a stream of consciousness. Only intellect, or rather intellectualism, and organized thought—*i.e.*, of scientific knowledge—cut snippets out of the *continuum* of reality. Still, modern knowledge allows for "specific" functioning—*e.g.*, of "desire," the "reproductive imagination," which is not the same thing as the "fancy." Moreover, specialization, differentiation, "ejection" widen vision and knowledge, and because of the solidarity of the soul in Christ react upon the whole Church. Is our modern plethora of pseudo-mysticisms, spiritisms and theosophies in no wise due to the English Church's neglect of varieties of prayer and the Communion of Saints? Further, systematization in prayer began in the Egyptian Church, as Cassian shows, and in the Byzantine

Church, not in the Latin, as is generally thought, and it is found in all historical religions—*e.g.*, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Sufism. The attempt of some writers on prayer to distinguish between mystical or personalistic or personalistic-theistic prayer and prophetical or prophetico-ethical petitionary prayer, and to confine systematization to the mystical side of prayer fails, for the simple reason that God is an Artist as well as a Creator, no two souls being exactly alike. Systematization is, therefore, bound up with the fact of individuality: "He calleth His sheep by name."

Nevertheless, it is also true that the range of personality in contemplation is generally wider than in normal meditation. For, in its lower stages, contemplation proceeds largely by those sides of personality—the "subconscious," the "unconscious," the "passivo-active," the "adorational," the "intuitive" and "instinctive," the "non-conative" and "effortless"—which psychology tends to show reach to the fuller depths of Being, self-knowledge, and insight, and also most effectually purge, adjust, and fructify the intellect, will, memory, imagination, and affections. And this is so just because the contemplative element is specially inhibitive of individualisms and the self-centredness of the Ego, since in the single thrust of contemplation all the strength of the inhibited tendencies is told over into a simplification of all our partial and subordinate selfhoods into the One Master-Self of all, God; the very *nuances* and *imponderabilia* of spirit aiding, yet without absorption, the process. Paradoxical as is this voluntary passivo-activity of contemplation, this semi-conscious or unconscious assimilation, it is really no more paradoxical than the motionlessness of a rapid wheel or the ease and silence of light. And God is Light and Silence and Unmoving Energy—*Actus purus*, dynamic because static, static because dynamic. Much as in the theory itself of electrons there is a central nucleus; or, as Professor Haldane says, a "constant normal" in biology subserved by its environment; or, as Dr. Matthews maintained at the recent Oxford Conference of Modern Churchmen, an unchanging nucleus of Truth beyond evolution itself.

It is this very simplification into Wholeness—so comprehensive because so undefinable—over against the part-values of the conscious, conative intellect and will, which so often split up the *continuum*—that gives that balance, "common sense," *sophronismos*, and practicality which are such marked features of the greater contemplatives and mystics, a Ruysbroeck, a St. John of the Cross, a St. Seraphim of Saroff, a St. Teresa.

To a practical pragmatic, and empirically materialized

nation like our own—which is apt to confuse the æsthetic activity of Truth with sentimentalism, and whose ethics are saturated with survivals of Protestantism, Puritanism, and the individualistic and hedonistic teaching of the eighteenth century English moralists, as well as with one-sided Pauline abstractions as against the "naturalness" of the Synoptic Records—contemplation, silence, and solitude will, perhaps, always seem to be stagnation and the enemy of our chief national characteristic—self-reliance—which moralism has so de-Christianized and de-personalized. And, undoubtedly, there are dangers in "instinct," "intuition," the imaginative faculty, the "subconscious" and "unconscious," and all the problems which centre in mysticism, passivity, quietism, and anti-intellectualism generally.

But perhaps there is truth in the saying of Goethe and the French that we are an intelligent rather than an intellectual nation. Our English philosophers have themselves pointed out that England stands almost alone in the world in never having originated a systematic interpretation of Reason and Reality able to command the allegiance and dominate the thought of other countries—a significant fact when we remember that Reason must be universal, international, and supranational. One of our favourite modern adjectives, "thoughtful," so dear to Bishops, is often but a poor thing at best.

Perhaps a change is being heralded by our growing cosmopolitanism and internationalism, by the *entente* and a possible league of nations. At any rate, the Earl of Balfour has said that nationality is only an "interlude," a step to internationalism and supranationalism. Academics and philosophers themselves are also beginning to talk about "the academic attempts at dehumanizing personality." Moreover, even the modernists—since it is characteristic of English religion to interpret religion mainly in terms of outward conduct—are demanding a "restatement" of our ethics in terms of more "livingness" and a fuller "humanism" and personality.

Whether and how this "restatement," or rather this personalizing and rescuing of ethics from thought-abstractions, will take place the next generation will probably see more clearly than we can at the present transitional stage. But the general trend, more especially of psychology, is to confirm the substantial teaching of the Church, East and West, on prayer; and the following summary facts may be adduced.

Christian prayer is always rational co-operation with a rational God in a rational universe. Even the mystics, as distinct from the mysticizers, say that intellect—which, let it be noted, is not the same thing as the understanding or intel-

lectualistic ratiocination—must be "king" in prayer. The understanding may be suspended in certain forms of prayer, but not the Reason; and one reason for the disfavour, suspicion, and contempt with which mysticism is often regarded, is that many fail to observe the distinction drawn by the mystics between the "intellect" and the "understanding," and their use of the word "intellect" to represent both or either.

But the criticisms of Bergson's theory of "intuition"—so dominant in many mystic, "silence," and "soul-quiet" cults to-day (and half of English devotion is quietism and Jansenism)—have produced at least one good result. They have shown more definitely that intuition can, and does, supplement intellect. This is the view of Plato and of Hegel himself—at least, in his younger days. Plato teaches that at a higher stage than that of discursive reason (*dianoia*) there is pure intellect, intuitive thought (*nous, noesis*), by which true reality is to be grasped; at a lower stage is opinion (*doxa*), not properly scientific because not dialectical or mathematical, which deals by more or less conjectural methods with the phenomena presented to sense perception. Broadly, this view is also that of many modern writers—Dr. Temple, Croce, Mr. Clutton-Brock—who hold that the intellect, as such, is powerless before its own dualisms, and needs the æsthetic and moral activities to fuse the diverging strands into the full vision of reality.

It is, of course, easy for this æsthetic activity to degenerate into emotionalism—and there are instances of this emotionalism in certain forms of prayer—perhaps even into sublimated eroticism, though here we are rather under the "spell" of Freud. But enthusiasm for the moral ideal and beauty as an inherent part of Truth, together with certain psycho-physical habituations, has undoubtedly a restraining effect upon the urgency of emotion; and this being so makes it possible for intellect and reflection to intervene before the response to stimulus takes place.

As regards the ethical bearing of this question, the Protestant, Neo-Protestant, and almost agnostic Ernst Troeltsch, who has made such a penetrating study of modern problems, has done good work in many ways—*e.g.*, by his theory of a polarity between a "humane" and an "other-worldly" ethic in Christianity, and by his insistence on "supernature." And although Bishop Gore maintains that there is more of Greek than Latin ethic in the English ethic, Greek philosophy leads logically to Neo-Platonism, and perhaps there is more of the emotional element in Plotinus than the Dean of St. Paul's would seem to admit. That there is a close connection between instinct and the moral and religious sentiments, and again between in-

stinctive and emotional dispositions, habit-formation and mind-formation; and that the shifting of the centre of values, ethical and of the interior life, takes place largely through the emotions and feelings, in the sense not of sentimentalism, but of what spiritual writers call the " affections " and " affective prayer " —all this is widely admitted, though the issue between Professor McDougall and Dr. Shand is not yet settled, and we may hesitate to accept all the conclusions of Professor Rivers's *Instinct and the Unconscious : A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-neuroses.* Even Professor Lloyd Morgan gives a place to instinct in a wider sense, as additive to reason and intellect, in religion and morals.

What is of special importance is that Dr. Sanday himself sanctioned the following words: " Jesus laid a good deal more stress on unconscious instinct than most moralists do." A well-known liberal theologian also declares that the " pivot " of the Gospel is not moral or philosophical codification, but personality, life, livingness, which are always more than Thought, or, rather, which adjust and correct thought; and ever since Plato the treatment of personality has been involved in difficulties because the accepted theory of knowledge—the abstractions of a Descartes, a Hume, a Locke, a Kant, a Hegel—has sought to " strait-jacket " God and man and life. It is, moreover, so sturdy and scholarly an Anglican as Dr. Swete who maintains that the laws of Christ's ascended Life are " pastoral " laws for the Church, and that the English Church is the weaker for the neglect of these laws. What are these laws ? They are the laws of the activities of prayer (" He ever liveth to make intercession "); of detachment, world-withdrawal, indirect influence, telepathy (" It is expedient for you that I go away "); of silence, " solitude," contemplation—yet enriched power—in the Father's bosom. Furthermore—to leave aside continental thinkers—both the Dean of St. Paul's and writers in *Mind* and the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* have drawn attention to the need for bringing the rich psychology and contemplative and ascetic values of the East, Russia, India, etc., to bear upon the too pragmatic and anarchic problems of ethics and theories of knowledge in the West. Fortunately, Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta's *A History of Indian Philosophy* (in progress) helps us to see how a purged *Vedanta* can serve Christianity. It must suffice to mention that the most recent theories on instinct and memory—and the right use of memory is of great importance in prayer—are substantially identical with the old Indian views, and that much in the Vijñāna School of Buddhism, in some respects so like M. Bergson's teaching, can elucidate points in meditation and

contemplation. Indeed, in general, it can hardly be doubted that we have over-Englished and over-Westernized Christ. But if the war means anything, it means world-contraction. We can no longer dress up Reason in insular academic robes. A new orientation—perhaps it is the old—has dawned which universalizes Reason.

Connected with this are certain Anglican theories on prayer and meditation, more especially as regards the nature and use of the intellect and the will, and the image or picture-element in meditating. Anglican and English devotion, for the most part, is based on a theory of consciousness, which is a mixture of Locke and Kant—viz., that consciousness is " the perception of what passes in a man's own mind." The result is that our devotion heads straight for subjectivity, self-contemplation, morbid or intellectual introspection, and so forth. God's voice is drowned in our fussy self-analysis and the Ego of our individual relationships to Him. It is the penalty we pay for the Cartesian *non-sequitur* which permeates the English mentality—" *I* think, therefore I *am*." " How rare it is," says St. Teresa, " to find a soul quiet enough to hear God's voice." Half of contemplation may be said to consist in " listening," and many of our meditations would be more fruitful if we remembered the aphorism, which applies also in prayer, that " it takes a good listener to make a good conversationalist." As to " listening " being auto-suggestion—this raises the whole question of the existence of a God and of idealism, realism, and mentalism. It is enough for our purpose that secondary automatisms or auto-suggestions are teleological within consciousness itself.

But whatever consciousness may or may not be—except that Christian consciousness involves an Object, God, outside as well as within us, to which our thought corresponds—any definition of consciousness must lie within such terms as these, that " it is a point of division between mind and not-mind." It is a " border state "; and secondary automatism enables the moralist to include within the sphere of his competence many acts and processes which *as experienced* are no longer voluntary or even conscious, and so it facilitates the " evolutionary " treatment of ethical data.

No doubt, too much can be made of the " subconscious " and " unconscious," though our normal materialized English ethical outlook and hatred of " mystification " and metaphysics —in a word, our love for the " Obvious " and minor premises—have rather minimized the possibility of ethical values in the " unconscious." But the " unconscious " *has* had ethical value in the contemplative and mystic experience of the Church, East and West. Royce himself admits it. That we usually know

these half-lit psychic regions through pathological cases does not do away with the fact that abnormal uprushes of the "unconscious" and "co-conscious" are often the source of valuable ideas and useful actions; and the whole Christian theory of prayer is based on a "co-consciousness"—"Christ in us," the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Jesus, interceding within us. This means a union which modern knowledge makes it impossible to treat as a mere moral unity of purpose, feeling, affection, as Protestantism and the nineteenth century treated it. It is rather a *vital* unity; not a symbol, but a reality—a transformation, as the mystics say, of self into Self, on the analogy of "possession" and the truth modern investigations into "personality" are making clearer—that personality is not a gift, given once for all through the fact of birth, but an achievement.

The truth is that Anglican devotion is built not only on Hume, Locke, and Kant, but also on Descartes' view of consciousness as mere *cognitive awareness.* But psychologists are beginning to ask themselves whether they can continue to construct the frame of psychology within this cognitive awareness only. We shall have to take account of the data of the "unconscious" also, and work out their ethical bearings, if, indeed, the Church has not already done so substantially. In point of fact, psycho-analysis and psycho-therapeutics are now turning away from the "subconscious," which has has such vogue, to the doctrine that the "unconscious" is found to be the best working hypothesis of the mind. We may compare St. Teresa's "the sleep of the powers" and the Vijñāna teaching on the "unconscious," which is like Bergson's *élan vital* in some respects.

At any rate, since consciousness is a "border state" between mind and not-mind, and involves both the volitional and the non-volitional, the voluntary and the involuntary; the conative, effortful teaching of the average English devotion on the intellect and will is missing and even atrophying sides of our Being. The result is that a good deal of English religion is almost purely ethical, or sanctified "goody-goodiness," or humanistic goodness; and even many who meditate regularly give the impression of "dissociated personalities" on the hunt for lost sides of their Being, and constantly fussing round their individualisms. Indeed, much of English meditation is an exercise in intellection only—a little sermon preached to ourselves, a study in Bible reflectiveness, a critical, analytical, mental gymnastic, sometimes aided out by Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* or the latest volume of *The International Critical Commentary.* But Bible study should be a prelude to medita-

tion, not a part of meditation itself. As Moberly used to say, we are so intent on "understanding"—which is apparently the only side of intellection with which we concern ourselves—and on the Pauline principle of co-operation with God, that we forget the equally Pauline principle of receptivity from God.

Now, without entering into the question of the relation between will and intellect, it does seem to be true that the greater mystics, who are said to be the aboriginal psychologists and philosophers, are not voluntarists—that is, they do not take up the standpoint that the ultimate nature of reality is to be conceived as some form of will in the sense of conation. They proceed rather from the standpoint of intellect as governing will. But they call in the principles of love and life and livingness to help; love being in its essence "uncommandable," and therefore non-conational, and Christianity being essentially a Life ("I am the Life"), and not in itself a Thought-system. So that we may expect the laws of biology to apply also in the moral and mental spheres, and these laws are primarily, not those of absolute conation, but rather of assimilation and coalescence.

It follows, then, (*a*) that pure, deliberate thought-work, or reflective intellectualistic thinking, is partial and fragmentary. It cuts snippets out of reality and the Whole, one reason for this being the "relativity" of the will. For we cannot act in this world of matter without becoming material; we cannot use our freedom without to some degree becoming a *thing* and ceasing to be a *person*. Reflective conative thought, then, it appears, is too purposive, active, self-distinguishing, self-preserving, and at the same time too unfree in its results, to do justice to the meaning of worship and prayer. Hegel was nodding when he identified *Gottesdienst* (worship) with *Denken* (thinking).

It follows (*b*) that fusion with God—love, union with God, the unitive process at which prayer aims—flows *round* our deliberate thought work rather than *through* it. That is to say, because love cannot be commanded and narrowed down into conation but must be spontaneous and free, fusion is also uncommandable by mere effort. Apart from God's transcendent action, it is by the *nuances* and *imponderabilia* of spirit that we reach the heart of God; and if intellect must enter, as enter it must and should, it must be floated in on the tide of this more central relationship.

Moreover, though Professor Pratt will not commit himself in his *Religious Consciousness*, it does not seem that we can altogether neglect the investigations of Watt, Bühler, Ach, Betts, Moore, Aveling, on the existence of "imageless thought," even

of " wordless thought," in consciousness. A series of experiments may be said to have proved that concepts are not the same as images, but are introspectively discriminable from them, and can and do occur alone in consciousness; they are, further, capable of objective reference and of conveying meaning by themselves, whereas images are not. Now that the image element or picture is necessary in meditation, especially in the case of beginners, there can be no doubt, though ordinary meditation and the Ignatian method do not suit all souls. Some of us are born Platonists, some Aristotelians. But one defect of Anglican meditation is the *over*-stressing of the picture-element, which accordingly " lop-sides " the soul into over-intellection at the expense of the other faculties, the affections, and the non-conative sides of the will. But there is a difference between the activity of consciousness in the " drifting " process of the association of ideas, and its power to stem the association current and turn it into new directions by means of the reflective-affective power of consciousness acting transcendentally—*i.e.*, rising above itself by over-individual norms. In other words, we should meditate both by images and words, and also by concepts and wordlessness; contemplative prayer being almost entirely conceptual and wordless, at least in its higher stages.

The reason for this lies in the very nature of love itself. Love acts not only by the particular, but also, and chiefly, by the " universal "—*i.e.*, by universalized ideas, concepts, by considering the Whole or totality as well as the part. True; love must particularize, individualize, for love is individuation, and it is through this very individuation of love that we gain insight, self-knowledge, penitence, and the virtues and dispositions of the soul. But individuation implies individualisms. It implies our sinful selfhood—all the negative qualities of self-love, self-will, and *pride*—which is really the only sin that Christianity teaches, though Protestantism and average English religion consider the breach of the Seventh Commandment the only real sin. But pride is the only sin Christianity teaches, just because Satan fell in the region of intellect; contemplating himself by individualized intellection and the part-values of intellect rather than contemplating God and the Wholeness and Fulness of Being. This is why spiritual writers repeat almost *ad nauseam* that we must " naught " ourselves, which the ordinary Englishman is apt to consider either as an invitation to *nirvana*—and there is nothing the Englishman so dreads losing as his objectivity, though he is a subjectivist; or he considers it weak sentimentality, just because he approaches his national asset of self-reliance and self-realization largely from the side of conative intellection and volition, and so he seeks to apply the same

methods to the self-realization of the Cross. Over and over again the confessor and director will discover that this false motivation, this one-sided and materialized "mentalism," is the source of failures in meditation and prayer. In fact, so one-sided and moralistic is much of our English religion that there are penitents who think intellectual pride means the same thing as being proud of being clever or thought clever.

But love must have its polarity between the particular and the universal, the individual and the over-individual, the soul and the "over-soul." And it is through the universal or "*Whole* vision" of love—in other words, through love "beholding" the Totality of God as He is *in Himself*, irrespective of what He does for us—that the idiosyncrasies of our limited and sinful selfhood and the subtle self-complacencies of our Ego are most penetratingly adjusted and purged. This is why writers on prayer, meditation, and contemplation so often tell us to "adore" or contemplate the Trinity and the attributes of God—His Holiness, Omniscience, Omnipotence; and that wordless prayer, and the prayer of concepts or whole ideas rather than of "images," most effectually quicken and nourish the mind and the will. St. Paul expresses the same truth in the words "our conversation—*i.e.*, life, true self—is in heaven," and that we are to be in the "heavenlies" in Christ Jesus (Eph. ii. 6). St. Thomas Aquinas, Troeltsch, Leontius of Byzantium, Lotze, are only expanding the same idea when they speak of "supernature" and of *complete* personality or *perfect* "humanity" being in God alone, though in any critical revision of some mediæval teaching on mysticism, contemplation and meditation, we may have to adjust Aquinas himself by Augustine's view that the "supernatural" and the "natural" cannot be sharply sundered, despite the fact that Augustine rather lost himself in a labyrinth over the meaning of "nature."

In these days of co-operation and competition we naturally tend to think of God as a tireless energizer on our behalf, as our universal provider and servant. We forget or minimize His self-existence and self-sufficiency. We are weary, we say, and have outgrown the mystification of metaphysics. Leuba's bitter gibe goes home: "In modern religion God is nothing more than a magnified meat purveyor." But no empiricism or immanence has ever yet driven out transcendence, or ever will. Man himself is a "yonder-sided animal." The tide of the "supernatural" is already dashing against our sand castles of humanism. Since the war the number of Carmelite convents in England has grown very considerably. A French Viscount becomes a contemplative solitary or anchorite in the Sahara. A royal Princess "buries" herself in a Teresian House. More

and more our Sisterhoods look to contemplative ideals. We are about, it seems, to repeat the experience of the counter-reformation, fighting with unearthly weapons the naturalism, humanism and rationalism of the reformation and the renaissance. Perhaps, too, what our Anglo-Catholic Congresses need most is a priestly revival on the lines of Fénelon's and Olier's "disinterested love" of God. Dr. Figgis himself told me privately that he thought Fénelon had the best of it in his fight with Bossuet on this question of disinterestedness, "supernature" and the "otherness" of God. L'Abbé Bremond, a powerful authority, concurs in the main, and so does Miss Sanders in her *Life of Bossuet*. One may ask whether the normal Anglican objection to this disinterested love of God is not a sophism resting on two hypotheses. First, that we have already reached perfect "humanity," which resides in God alone, and came forth in the incarnate Christ. Secondly, that we can judge of God by our present imperfect humanity and humanism, which turns God from being a Person or Personality, and the only complete Personality, into a mere ethical notion on the basis of the evolutionary ethic of our *created and incomplete* humanity. This is the underlying assumption of all Jansenism, and ordinary Anglican devotion is riddled with Jansenism.

What has been said of the intellect applies also to the will. The concrete, individual will is the canker of our national Pelagianism; which, however, will apparently be seriously damaged by psychology, if only because psychology is showing that the activities of the unconscious and effortless will—that is, in spiritual language, the quiescent, resigned will—are often more powerful than those of the conscious will. Indeed, the lessons of the conative, concrete will may be read in Germany's "will to power." But "the will to love"—for will must come in—must have its quiescence and undercurrents, just as the activity on the surface of a great river is strong only in proportion to its still and hidden depths. True; the will works in the concrete. But what it consciously sets up in the concrete world is its own ideas, mouldings, and improvements upon a given reality, pseudo-individual objects, imitations of the concrete. It is purblind to the "whole idea" and to the "margins" and *nuances* of the self. Yet it is at the margin where the conquering light meets the receding darkness that love finds its highest inspirations. And a purblind will means a progressingly impoverished self.

In a book which should be read by all who wish to pray and meditate better—W. Hilton's *Scale of Perfection*—Hilton writes: "Thou must understand that in meditation and con-

templation and prayer no certain rules can be set for everyone to observe, for they are in the free gift of our Lord, according to the diverse dispositions of chosen souls." But "grooviness" is a common defect in Anglican devotion—due to many causes. Three may be mentioned: (1) Our national fear of adventurousness even in the world of thought. We prefer the beaten track and our blinkered moralism, and call it "sober judgment" and the wisdom of the "golden mean." (2) The perversion bequeathed us by the Reformation and Puritanism whereby prayer, which is *love*, became *duty;* and we have completed the process by turning the good and necessary word "duty" into regimentation, whence the devotional "audit-sheets" of Anglicanism—so much intercession, so many Rules of Life, so many Guilds, so many Sodalities, so many badges, so many medals, etc. (3) The bad training and ignorance of the clergy of ascetical and mystical theology. This Anglo-Catholic Congresses should certainly reform. For it is not so much moral theology that we need to-day as ascetical theology.

But love must adventure, or it withers and dies. Christ is variety in unity, because personality is variety in unity. Heaven is the mosaic of character, as the Church has always taught, and psychology and biology confirm the Church's teaching.

Psychology shows that: (*a*) To use Professor James Ward's words: "A field of consciousness unaltered by change would be a blank and a contradiction." (*b*) That individuals are "variously eye-minded, ear-minded, tongue-minded, or hand-(motor-) minded; some are none of these, their thinking being imageless. Most people are now one and now the other; hence prayer is sometimes spoken, sometimes only murmured on the lips, sometimes framed in the mind's eye, sometimes fashioned in the work of our hands, sometimes conceived but not imaged forth; and once the real nature of prayer is realized, it will be seen that there is no real antithesis involved, that prayer is sometimes vocal, sometimes silent, sometimes wordless." (*c*) It has long been known that the process of "thinking" conforms generally to one of two types. In some individuals it is dependent on a series of verbal ideas (meditation), in others on a series of visual pictures (contemplation). Of the two, the visual type is the more primitive. It is found in infants, children, and among primitive peoples. Compare the Sumerian, Chinese and hieroglyphic pictorial writing. In keeping with this is a phenomenon which never fails to surprise those who are beginning to acquire the *technique* of psycho-analysis—namely, that patients, when coming to narrate the experiences of early childhood, recall their infantile memories as visual

pictures detailed and vivid as the happenings of yesterday. In much the same way forgotten events of long ago are often reproduced in dreams pictorially.

If we bear in mind that we learn more by the "eye than the ear;" the principle of "object-lessons" in education; and what has already been said of the Platonic distinction between *dianoia* and *nous* or *noesis*, we have here a clue to why the great saints of prayer are nearly all contemplatives, and why our Lord said: "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." Since also, Christianity is primarily a Life, and not a Thought-system, we have a further clue in the "mutations," variations, "atavisms," and "reversions to type" of biology, and it is becoming clearer that biological phenomena, and especially "evolution," cannot be rationally interpreted except by allowing to every stage of life its corresponding degree of mind and morality—a bio-mentality and a bio-morality.

THE ABBOT OF PERSHORE.

(To be continued.)

THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

IT is the writer's object to set forth the view that the conception of punishment is a complex conception composed of three elements, retributive, reformative, and deterrent.

Christian Ethics accepts the Moral Law as *a priori;* but it must be remembered that the term is an abstraction. The Moral Law is the expressed Will of God. If the cold code of Morality be not clothed with the warmth of the Personality of God, it will be the mere fetish of rationalism. Kantian ethics ends by postulating the existence of God, not in order to guarantee the authority of the Categorical Imperative, but because the moral consciousness requires a Being to estimate the exact amount of happiness due to the moral man. ". . . we are not merely bound, but compelled by a necessity which is bound up as a requirement with the idea of duty, to presuppose the possibility of this highest Good, which can be secured only under condition of the existence of God—*i.e.*, it is morally necessary to assume the necessity of God."* For him ethics presupposes religion. But Green, who began where Kant began, makes the connection much closer. He says that "moral activity" is "only explicable on supposition of a certain reproduction of itself, on the part of this eternal mind,

* Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii., p. 296.

as the self of man."* "But the idea (the moral ideal) as it is in the individual man, however indefinite and unfulfilled, is a communication in germ or principle of the idea as it is in God. . . ."† A great danger attending the conception of Moral Law as impersonal is the reduction of moral standards to a basis of custom and convenience. Psychology may, since it takes the matter-of-fact view, regard instinct as the raw material of personality; but failure to see that the Moral Law transcends that through which it has become explicit must rob "I ought" of its supremacy. "Like reason itself, of which it is an aspect, like beauty, so righteousness belongs to the universal and eternal Being, and because this is so, men have called this Being God, and worshipped it."‡

Had Kant, like Butler, adopted an *a posteriori* method, he might have been led to ground ethics in religion; he sets forth with critical keenness a cleavage in man's make-up. On the one side there is sensuous nature, and on the other practical reason. Between them there is a great gulf fixed. The will finds it difficult, nay, impossible in every case to will the Moral Law. "Evil is present with me"; but where? Not in sensuous nature, "for if we regard it alone, and leave out of account the motives which arise out of freedom, we reduce man to a mere animal. On the other hand, an *evil reason* (or absolutely evil will) which should declare itself free of the moral law, contains too much; for in such a will, opposition to the law would itself become the motive of action, and the subject would thus become neither more nor less than a devil."§ The conclusion is that the origin of evil is "unsearchable." And yet we are responsible. "We are conscious of it, as that which ought not to be, and therefore, as that which we could have hindered from being."‖ The evil act cannot be explained by a previous act; that would be simply the first step in an infinite series of evil acts. We can only take refuge in tracing its cause to an "intelligible act which we can know only through reason, and not as empirically given in sense under conditions of time." Obviously its origin lies somehow in the supersensible. Men, as a matter of experience, have preferred the maxims of self-love to those of the Moral Law, but the reason for their preference "lies beyond rational discovery."¶

Like Pelagius, Kant has tried to hold man in a vacuum; but he will not admit in so many words that evil resides in the will. The will is a ready-made thing, a full-grown faculty;

* *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 198.
† *Ib.*, p. 221.
‡ Gore, *Belief in God*, 1922, p. 56.
§ Caird, *ib.*, p. 568.
‖ *Ib.*, p. 566.
¶ R. S. Moxon, *The Doctrine of Sin*, 1922, p. 183.

but surely there is a shading off in degrees of good and evil from "an *evil reason* (absolutely evil will)" in which wills are neither wholly good or evil? And being such, they can be influenced by a Kantian God—"a Being who is quite distinct from nature, and at the same time the cause of it, and who contains in himself the ground of this realization—*i.e.*, of the realization of the combination of happiness with goodness." If God is such a ground, may He not guide and help without necessarily depriving man of free will? "The true consequence of Kant's doctrine is *grace*, and this prayer, '*Create* in me a clean heart, O God.'"*

But prayer and the sacraments savour of superstition. We are to move from virtue to grace, not from grace to virtue. "Thus Baptism . . . and the Lord's Supper . . . have a *relative* value, as they help towards the development of pure moral habit of mind in those who partake in them; but to suppose them to be of any worth in themselves, apart from such influence, is to make them fetishes."† With a great price Kant has obtained for man his freedom.

Kant's caution is necessitated by the clear-cut distinction he draws between the *noumenal* and the *phenomenal* self. Metaphysics colour his ethics, and prevent him from walking to and fro in the domain of religion. Martineau, who insists as strongly on the manifest authority of the Moral Law, does not hesitate to say that the relation "between the moral consciousness and the Divine authority, is one, not so much of *inference*, as of identification."‡ He argues that a "detached"§ personality would have no standard for adjusting a lower to a higher faculty. Man would be out of joint with his universe if it were impersonal; duty has meaning only in relation to a Person higher than I. ". . . surely, if the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on our *self*—therefore no mere part of it—hovering over and transcending our personality, though also mingling with our consciousness, and manifested through its intimations."‖ The *homo noumenon* cannot have its centre of gravity in a mere impersonal Law which is *ex hypothesi* less than he. "Is not our only way of escape from the embarrassment created by the presence in us of this implanted sentiment of reverence for what, though bound up with our personality, is yet, as the object of reverence, distinguished from it, the frank recognition of a Personal God . . . who is not only

* Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, E.T., vol. i., p. 58.
† Caird, *ib.*, p. 588.
‡ Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii., p. 235.
§ *Ib.*, p. 104. ‖ *Ib.*, p. 104.

immanent, but transcendent, with whom a relation only to be described as personal intercourse is possible, and is, in the experience of Religion, actually enjoyed ?"*

The nearest approach to such a Person as the locus of the human will in Kant is in the Social Contract, where the *homo noumenon* subjects the *homo phenomenon* to the State. The Contract is based on an Idea of Reason, which makes society possible. " We are not . . . to say that man in the State has sacrificed a *part* of his innate external freedom to secure an end; we are to say that he has surrendered the whole of his wild and lawless freedom in order to find it all again undiminished in a dependence regulated by law. For such dependence springs out of his own legislative will, and therefore is one with freedom."† And yet to identify Duty with the Will of God is heteronomy !

Only by holding fast to the unity of the self as it is presented by Plato, can we be saved from a distinction between metaphysics, ethics, and religion which is made for any purpose save that of logical clearness. Once you divide the self, you cannot find a principle to bind up the parts again; nor have you a principle to bind together the strands of reality to which they correspond. It is true that the *Timæus* locates the spirited element in the heart, the appetitive element in the belly, and the divine element in the head. The first two taken together constitute the mortal soul, while the third is immortal soul. But with this analysis we must compare his doctrine of the immortality of the soul. " All soul is immortal."‡ Soul is immaterial, and cannot be conceived as residing in three different parts of the body. The soul is to be thought of as acting in three ways; and her mortality is consequent upon her immanence in a material body. " Θνητὸν, then, is the name given to the soul acting under certain conditions; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist *qua* soul, but because she ceases to operate *qua* emotional and appetitive soul."§

In the Platonic system metaphysics, ethics, and religion interpenetrate; indeed, it might be more correct to say that religion is the ground of the other members. Faith in the rational character of the universe, and both in self and in other selves as capable of morality in that universe, presupposes that temper of mind suggested in the Myths. In them there is presented, for imagination rather than for understanding, the true nature of the soul and its relation to a Personal God.

* Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, 1920, p. 126.
† Caird, *ib.*, p. 332. ‡ *Phædrus*, 245, D.
§ Archer-Hind, *The Phædo of Plato*, 1883, p. 29.

The "*a priori* in conduct and knowledge"* is set forth most clearly in the *Phædrus* Myth, where "we have a complete account of the whole History of the Soul—its condition before incarnation, the cause of its incarnation, and the stages of its life, incarnate and disembodied, till it returns to its original disembodied state."† Naked and unashamed it has once upon a time looked upon the Categorical Imperative, and therefore it must hope; it has contemplated True Knowledge, and therefore experience is possible. "In the journey round the Soul beholdeth Justice Itself, she beholdeth Temperance Itself, she beholdeth True Knowledge; not that knowledge which is with generation, and differeth in respect unto different of those things concerning which we now say that '*they are*': but the knowledge which standeth in That which Verily Is."‡ To a philosopher justice is no abstraction, "it is the ultimate principle upon which God has constructed the universe, in making it in His own image" (*Tim.* 29, E f.)§

In the Philosophy of the Christian Religion the Principle of the Incarnation, with its corollary, the fact of Pentecost, holds together the mutually penetrating elements of the human mind, and preserves them in living touch with God and the universe. "All things were made" by the Logos, and by Him they are sustained in being and reciprocity; it is His laws that function in matter, in instinct, and in self-conscious selves. "In Him all things consist."‖ He, "in whom we live and move and have our being," unites us with the world in which our duties must be carried out, and imparts to us the grace by which all that we do of worth is done. God communicates to the natural man the humanity of Jesus Christ, and he becomes a spiritual man. Purpose dominates his life, just because it is "the age-long purpose of God."¶ According as his faculties are severally united to work out the purpose of God, and therefore the purpose of self, so he grows in grace, and in Christ his "potential perfection is made real."** There is no compulsion of will; there is the drawing by "bands of love,"†† by a gift of the Spirit. The law is in "the inward parts":‡‡ the soul is unified§§ as it makes the effort in Christ. Christian Theism "gives us a reason for transcending ethical atomism, because it must hold that there can be no irreconcilable conflict

* J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, 1905, p. 51.
† *Ib.*, p. 338. ‡ *Phædrus*, 247, D E.
§ R. C. Lodge, "Reality and the Moral Judgment in Plato," in *The Philosophical Review*, September, 1920, p. 461.
‖ Col. i. 17.
¶ Eph. iii. 11; see A. H. McNeile, *St. Paul, His Life and Letters and Christian Doctrine*, 1920, p. 282.
** *Ib.*, p. 285. †† Hos. ii. 4. ‡‡ Jer. xxxi. 33.
§§ *Cf.* Ps. lxxxvi, 11, R.V.

between the good of one individual and the good of others, since it believes that all spiritual beings move towards an Inclusive End towards which they are drawn, but not compelled."*

Only on the background of the Incarnation can we defend the identity of autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy. When the Categorical Imperative is embraced, it is its own authority, simply because in its personal choice the Christ within answers "Yes" to the Christ without. Commenting on the question, "Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?"† Dr. Rashdall says, "Doubtless He thought of that inner light in other men as coming from the same heavenly Father who had in an exceptional way spoken in the Old Testament Scriptures and was speaking also in Him; but it was a voice within, not a mere external voice, to which He appealed in confirmation of the claim which he made upon their allegiance."†

Yes; the Moral Law is Personal because it expresses in me, first in my instincts, and later in my self-conscious reason, the Person of God in Christ through the Holy Spirit; and in that Person my personality grows.

Let us now approach the theory of punishment in the light of Christian Theism, which treats men, not as "impervious monads,"‡ but as children of a Father in whose world they are both nourished and provided with all the materials that pertain to the making of personality; because both children and world have been pervaded and redeemed by an Only Son, whose Will may operate in them in so far as their finite wills identify themselves with His purpose.

A man sins; he wills that which conscience within and God without have agreed in condemning. He is not related to God as closely as before the act. The act has placed a barrier between the Source of Divine Grace and its recipient; for the sinner has willed to depart into a far country. God has not removed Himself; rather the sinner has removed himself from God; we may speak of him as forsaken by God. He would live by himself; so far as he is apart from God he is dead. ". . . the wicked have life of body, but none of soul; their souls being dead (that is, forsaken of God)."§

God's action is not arbitrary. He is expressing His Moral Nature in all His acts. He "desireth not the death of a sinner"; but He automatically recoils from an evil will. Good

* W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, 1921, p. 148.
† H. Rashdall, *Conscience and Christ*, 1916, p. 35.
‡ W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. ii., p. 134.
§ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, xiii., 2.

has no fellowship with bad. The evil will must be shown up as alien to the Will of God. "The wages of selfishness is death. Of course it is; for by death St. Paul meant separation from God, loss of God, the losing of God's love; and if we go on long enough in wilful selfishness we must cut ourselves off from God's love. Love abused is love lost, and love lost is hell."* "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold down the truth in unrighteousness."†

God must assert in no uncertain way the character of Himself, the character of the universe, and the potential character of His children lest His purpose be thwarted. He must show us, when we forget it, that only in Christ is there life and growth of character. To forgetful man He must vindicate His Personal Law. If religion means anything, it demands the "conservation of value.‡

So far, punishment is viewed as external; God allows Himself to be withdrawn from His child. But Christian Theism is conscious of a deeper pain. The conscience within stands over against the evil will and disrupts the person. He, the evil will, is aware that he stands over against his true self. His person is dissociated. The Spirit within groans and convicts him of guilt. The act is his very own; it need not have been. The grace of God, from which he cannot altogether free himself, causes an inner dialectic to struggle within him. "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is present in my members."§ The past looms large and disturbs the present. Until the offending member is cast away there is no balance of elements, no equipoise, no rest, no peace, no self. The purpose of God as expressed in conscience must harmonize the scattered and conflicting reactions to stimuli into a personality. By the grace of God the sinner may find a mental centre of gravity. He may learn to focus his impulsive tendencies to a common point, the Will of God as his conscience sees it. But he must pass through a stage of internal struggle and be sundered into warring elements; this state of pain is his inner punishment.

Both these pains are automatic. They are the inevitable result of sin, and they are parallel. The one is the counter-

* Bishop of Lichfield, *The Christian Call and Motive*, 1922, p. 49.

† Rom. i. 18.

‡ H. Hoffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 10: ". . . the above-mentioned axiom is the fundamental thought of all religion" (the axiom of the conservation of value).

§ Rom. vii. 22–23.

part of the other; in the first case God Transcendent reacts, in the second, God Immanent. We may include them both under the term retribution.

Retribution as thus understood carries with it implicitly the idea of punishment as also reformative. God is love. The Father's children are to become full-grown. The Spirit's fruit is to bloom in their lives. Their wills are to be harmonized with His. Hence pain as retribution may be transfigured, if the grace of God is allowed to give the sinner a new point of view and aim. The soul's equilibrium may be restored if the evil will will become good. From this angle, punishment is the discipline of our Loving Father. Punishment, then, as reformative is punishment as retribution interpreted by a child who sees that his Father has provided a means whereby he may come to himself. The Father, in the most emphatic possible way, has shown him that sin entails separation and pain; this is the retributive element. The son, in the light of grace, determines to see in his chastisement the Hand of the Father. The sinner on whom a pain is laid—on whom the law of righteousness has exerted its force—must treat his penalty as a Personal reaction from God; in doing so he sees that the penalty has been deserved, and that it is to alter his relationship to God. The penalty is the means whereby he is "educated" into a true apprehension of God's relation to him as the Father of spirits.

The third element in punishment, the deterrent, is also implicit. The sinner is led to associate pain with certain acts and, in consequence, avoids them. But in this case we are on rather lower ground; for the same degree of faith is not in evidence. The sinner may avoid certain actions from motives of fear if the retributive element is not equally strongly expressed.

It will be observed that the retributive element is the pivot of the theory of punishment in Christian ethics interpreted as it must be by the Philosophy of the Christian religion. In the last few years the Fatherhood of God has been run to death; and it is high time that we recalled to mind that the Fatherhood of God is not to be interpreted after the analogy of an indulgent parent. Calvinism is gone; but it did at least proclaim the Holiness of God with definiteness. The Holiness of God is banked like a golden strand across the Bible. Mr. Snowden says that God "revealed Himself to the Jews first as 'holiness,' and their whole religion was directed to impress upon them the truth that their God was a 'holy' God. The fires of Sinai; the laws of clean and unclean; the blood of the sin-offerings and other sacrifices; the white robes and lustra-

tions of the priests; the Day of Atonement and the Passover, were all directed to teach the one great lesson—'The Lord your God is holy: be ye therefore holy.'"* "Moreover, all those passages which speak of God as 'Light,' in Whom is no darkness at all, Whose first creation was light, and Who is the Light of His last creation, the heavenly city; and of our Lord Jesus Christ as the Light of the world, the Sun of Righteousness, the true Light which lighteneth every man as he cometh into the world—all these passages teach the same doctrine, that holiness is the fundamental characteristic of God."† God's love is a holy love. He would "educate" us into holiness. And in order that His Holy Will may be safeguarded as an objective reality, we use the term "retributive" to describe His punishments. We could not say that pain inflicted on a good man because of a good deed was a punishment. We punish only when morality is at stake. Our reformative processes are justified as pain-giving only on the certainty of morality being an element in God's own Teleology. It is of the grace of God that the wayward son must eat the husks that swine eat. By the grace of God reflection on his painful state brought him to "himself" and to his Father.

Nor does God deter us from good actions; did He act thus He would deny Himself. We are deterred that we may freely embrace His Will and live in Him. A retributive element here also saves deterrence from arbitrariness.

Martensen holds that punishment is in essence retribution. "The proper conception of punishment is retribution, that 'judgment shall return to righteousness' (Ps. xciv. 15), 'the law be maintained' (Ps. cxi. 7-8), and 'man may reap what he has sowed' (Gal. vi. 7)."‡ But he continues: "That regard to reformation does not *necessarily* belong to the conception of punishment, but is only an additional element, so far as punishment is admitted into the teleology (the final cause) of grace, is clearly seen from the discourses of our Lord concerning the last judgment, where the damned are banished into the outer darkness." But in this treatment of punishment we are concerned only with the theory as it appears in Christian ethics. Those who have, by constant continuation in wrong-doing, willed themselves outside the sphere of grace are not to be considered as having a relation to God at all. The soul that ceases to live and move and have its being in God has ceased to live. The bad fish were thrown away; the tares are to be burned; the guest without a wedding garment was cast out;

* P. L. Snowden, *The Atonement and Ourselves*, p. 41
† *Ib.*, p. 42.
‡ *Christian Ethics*, E.T., vol. i., p. 134.

the unprepared virgins were not admitted to the wedding. In an interesting note Dr. Gore says, "Finally lost souls—only so by their persistence in refusing the known good and choosing the evil—I feel bound to believe there may be. To believe that it may be so is, I think, bound up with accepting the reality of moral freedom. But I conceive that the lost also will recognize that the mind of God towards them was only good. And though their awakening must be awful indeed, and the figures under which it is described are so, I do not think an orthodox Christian is precluded from hoping that the issue of hell, which is the state of the lost, will be extinction of personal consciousness or dissolution of personality."* The Logos doctrine is instinct with teleology; and since we are attempting to interpret a theory of punishment which will be consistent with it, we are precluded from applying the term "punishment" to those that are lost. To have crushed the last traces of the Immanent Logos into nothingness is to have ceased to live. "Father Benson lays it down that to the finite mind all infinite truth (or truth about the Infinite) must come in the form of a contradiction; further, that if we could understand it, it would not be true. So Westcott is recorded to have said that he never felt satisfied he was on the right road in his quest for truth unless he came upon a flat contradiction."† We can, as the children of our Father, trust in His Holy Love.

Martensen agrees that inside the realm of grace punishment contains an educative element. "But so long as the time of grace lasts, so long as a man, even outside the region of redemption, is an object of the educative providence of God, one may no doubt discover a pedagogic element in punishment, in which reforming grace makes itself manifest. In the stricter meaning of the word, however, no punishment can reform man; at the best it can only exert a preparatory influence, to induce the man to *seek* reformation, to lay hold of the gospel, which alone can bestow the power for thorough redemption and renewal of the man. Only in the region of redemption, only for those who are become God's children, punishment is transformed into paternal discipline (*παιδεία*) and trial."‡ In accepting this statement we must make a reservation: that our view of the Moral Law as Personal and as producing personality in man entitles us to believe that the assertion of the former (retribution) in the latter (education) precludes a Deistic view of punishment as merely retributive.

On this point F. H. Bradley was taken to task by Dr.

* *Belief in God*, p. 159.
† E. Lyttleton, "Eternal Punishment," THEOLOGY, June, 1922, p. 327.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 134.

Rashdall. " We pay the penalty because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever, than because it is merited by wrong, it is gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. . . . Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant, but these are external to the matter . . ."* Here, in Bradley's view, human punishment is retributive, while the educative element is a mere plus. Dr. Rashdall makes the comment, " If punishment is ' modified ' for utilitarian reasons, does that not mean that it is inflicted partly for retribution and partly for some other reason? If so, we do not pay the penalty because we owe it, *and for no other reason.*"† Bradley would explain punishment by reference to the past: " it is inflicted for the sake of punishment ":‡ it is " an end in itself."§ This follows from his definition of punishment. " Punishment is the denial of wrong by the assertion of right, and the wrong exists in the self, or will, of the individual; his self is a wrongful self, and is realized in his person and possessions; he has asserted in them his wrongful will, the incarnate denial of right; and in denying that assertion, and annihilating, whether wholly or partially, that incarnation by fine or imprisonment, or even by death, we annihilate the wrong and manifest the right; and since this, as we saw, was an end in itself, so punishment is also an end in itself."‖ It may be pointed out that Law is not abstract; and that it is not " we " but the sinner who is to annihilate the wrong. He, and not " we," must assert the good will. " He willeth that we should be saved, but He willeth not to do violence to our will, which He holds sacred, as the finite image of His own Infinite Will, free, after the likeness of His own Almighty Will, ' Who doth whatsoever pleaseth Him.' "¶

On the other hand, Dr. Rashdall will not allow that punishment as retributive is moral at all. " The theory . . . is quite inconsistent with that Christian ethic which sums up the whole moral law in the requirement of universal love, and with that Christian theology which regards love as the most adequate expression of the character of God. Love cannot inflict pain or other evil except as a means to some good."** The fact remains that it is *pain* and not pleasure that our Heavenly Father inflicts; and that He inflicts it on wills that have disobeyed the Moral Law—viz., rejected the inner promptings of

* *Ethical Studies*, 1876, p. 25.
† *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 288.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 26. § *Ib.*, p. 25. ‖ *Ib.*, p. 25.
¶ E. B. Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?* 1880, p. 31.
** *The Theory of Atonement in Christian Theology*, 1920, p. 422.

the Spirit. "The question is whether, *apart* from its effects, there would be any moral propriety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake."* But pain is not inflicted for pain's sake; it is the occasion whereby the sinner may discover his state of will and convert. He may, at pain's warning, pull himself up. As Butler has it, "The present world is *peculiarly fit* to be a state of discipline. For the various temptations with which we are surrounded; . . . our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow . . . these things, though some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when duly reflected upon have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us to a settled condition and reasonableness of temper . . ."† Are we not justified in retaining the term "retribution" to express the occasion of our education as painful ?‡

Dr. Rashdall is far from denying that pain may be a means to good. He shrinks not so much from what is spoken of in this essay as retribution, as from the word with its attendant abstract and cruel associations. "But no one will deny that under certain circumstances, and with men of certain temperaments, great moral changes are often produced by calamity of one kind or another. In some cases it is direct and immediate; in other cases the effect is produced indirectly through the awakening of religious emotion. In either case, of course, all that the misfortune does is to create conditions of mind favourable to the action of higher motives and considerations, or to remove conditions unfavourable to their action."§ The fact remains that because of disobedience to His Will, and to our higher self, the "conditions of mind" were allowed. It is surely logical to connect the means and the end under the one term "punishment." Dr. Rashdall makes the statement, "Punishment is necessarily painful, or it ceases to be punishment."‖ He goes as far as to say that in certain cases it may be justifiable to inflict pain where there is no hope of the offender voluntarily embracing the Moral Law within him. ". . . We may perhaps go one step further, and maintain that even in cases where punishment will not have a reformatory effect, where the tendencies to evil are too strong to be kept in check by fear, even then the punishment may be, in a sense, for the moral good of the offender. . . . But still, it is always

* H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, p. 286.

† *The Analogy of Religion*, J. H. Bernard's edition, 1900, p. 91.

‡ In *Conscience and Christ*, p. 130, Dr. Rashdall writes: "If the man believes in a perfectly righteous Being whose Will is identical with the law of his Conscience . . . his sorrow will be deepened, and will assume the form of a desire for reconciliation with that Being, which will most naturally express itself in confession and prayer for forgiveness, restitution, change of will." But in an "educative" theory how can there be *restitution ?*

§ *The Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 293. ‖ *Ib.*, p. 292.

a certain effect on consciousness and character that constitutes its justification, not merely the satisfaction of an impersonal and irrational law."* In reply, it may be said that Christian ethics cannot predicate good of a state of consciousness that is not voluntarily chosen as such; nor is the Moral Law either impersonal or irrational. Such a view emphasizes the means at the expense of the end. "Wickedness humbled and subdued, though it be only by external force, is a healthier condition than wickedness triumphant."† A sinner, whose will is in such a condition as to preclude the effort to reform, is outside the working of Divine grace; and it is a doubtful presumption if such exists in this world. In any case, I do not see that the presumption is sufficiently strong to warrant the infliction of pain. To such a one, pain could never be a means to anything but pain. An evil will merely thwarted still remains an evil will. The end of punishment is not to thwart: it seeks rather to bring the sinner to "himself," to his true nature as an image of God.

Dr. Rashdall recognizes that the theories of punishment, as "deterrent" and "reformatory," are inadequate to express its true character. "There is a side of punishment which might perhaps be best expressed by the term 'educative theory'; or perhaps we might say that the end of punishment is partly deterrent or utilitarian, and partly *ethical*."‡ Again, "Even the Moral Law itself is not an end in itself, but only souls or wills recognizing and regulating their action by the Moral Law."§ These two statements taken together give all that we are contending for, with the proviso that punishment asserts such a Law, not as something alien and external to the sinner, but that it asserts it because it *must* assert that which is common to him and to His Heavenly Father.

No doubt it is grossly immoral to express the instinct of revenge when it stands in opposition to a judgment of the Practical Reason. But there is no absurdity in holding that in the moral man reason ought to be coincident with instinct. Instinct can be rationalized, and so become the spring of the moral judgment. When this is so, the moral man naturally reacts against the immoral act of another. At a lower stage he might have leaped upon the offender and vented his anger; but now an impersonal judge acting in the name of the law of the community, which is an approximation to the Law of God, reacts in such a way that by the ministry of pain the evil will may be guided to choose the good. We are concerned just now with God's punishments; but it is necessary to make this

* *The Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 294.
† *Ib.*, p. 294.
‡ *Ib.*, p. 303.
§ *Ib.*, p. 301.

digression, since retribution is objected to frequently on the ground that it is merely instinctive and irrational. If, it is said, the vindictive impulse, which is retribution in germ, is immoral, it cannot be right to ascribe any form of retribution to Divine punishment. But if we start from the other end and look upon instinctive and impulsive actions as premoral and implicitly rational, because the Immanent Life of the Logos operates in them, the moral reaction in retribution is the explicit moral judgment come to consciousness. "The connection with the *lex talionis*, then, lies not in the *lex talionis* expressing in full a sentiment of which the doctrine of punishment for punishment's sake, or of retribution, is an enfeebled relic. It is said that the customs which resulted in the *lex talionis* embodied a rude fore-feeling of the truth that wrong demands a negation, which has become, and is becoming, more and more obvious as the disguise of anger and revenge is being stripped off the necessary social reaction by the advance of civilization."* It is unfair to prejudice retribution as a reaction without respect of persons against an evil will by confusing it with vengeance, anger, and vindictiveness. Retribution is just these things purified from arbitrariness, cruelty, and self-interest. ". . . first of all, moral resentment wants to raise a protest against wrong. And the immediate aim of punishment has always been to give expression to the righteous indignation of the society which inflicts it."† If we must be anthropomorphic, let us explain God's actions by means of man's best.‡

The ethics of Hegel, which sets forth the ego as gradually explicating its latent and implicit character by means of an inherent dialectic, has a place for punishment as deterrent and reformative. The finite will reacting to the experiences of life unfolds itself as moral and religious. But the kernel of the theory is retribution. In the wake of the evil will there follows the Moral Law, which is its condemnation. The will is revealed as evil simply because it stands over against an infinite element that demands to be made explicit, so that it may pervade and take into itself the mere finite will set on its merely individual preference. Crime may exist, but it has no reality; reality must demonstrate the paradox—it must disannul the merely existent. "By crime something is altered, and exists as so altered. But this existence is the opposite of itself, and so far null. But right, as absolute, is precisely what refuses to be set aside. Hence it is the manifestation of the crime that

* B. Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, 1919, p. 197.
† Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i., p. 89.
‡ *Cf.* W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, p. 55.

is intrinsically null, and this nullity is the result of all crime. But what is null must manifest itself as such, and make itself known as that which violates itself. The criminal act is not the primary and positive, to which punishment comes as the negative. It *is* the negative, and punishment is only the negation of a negation. Actual right destroys and replaces injury, thus showing its validity and verifying as a necessary factor in reality."* Were there no Moral Law there would be no crime, and there could be no punishment; a universal and necessary element lies behind them. The reality of justice must be asserted in and by the sinner's will. Retribution is thus understood by Hegel. It is not so much the pivot of the two other theories, deterrent and reformative: "it is itself the notion of the whole, a principle within which the other aspects are contained."† "The reformation which punishment should bring about is not an addition to the first principle, but is rooted in the latter; it is the assertion of the criminal's own intrinsic will regarded from a special angle. So, too, punishment deters because of the identity in substance of all individual wills, and its particular modes are developments which punishment undergoes when the right it asserts and restores is no longer abstract, but is articulated into the law of an organized state. There is no need to find a further principle to explain the system within which retribution, reformation, and prevention fall. The idea of retribution is itself the notion of which that system is the idea."‡ We have travelled a long way from the Deistic retribution of Kant, who is concerned with a mere vindication of the abstract Moral Law. The crime is in the sinner; he has negated his real self. Punishment is complex because it is concerned to vindicate the Moral Law as something that ought to be in the sinner. "This is the double character which keeps all the aspects of punishment together. It is a negation of an evil will which has been realized in action. . . . Deterrence and reformation are subordinate aspects implied within it; not consequences beyond it to which it is a mere instrument, and by which, therefore, it could be determined without limit."§

In conclusion, let us remind ourselves that the theory of punishment must be interpreted in the light of the Incarnation, which reveals a painful state of mind as a means which the sinner may use and return to God. Our Father educates us. The Holy Spirit dwells in us; and every thought of holiness is

* Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, E.T., by S. W. Dyde, 1896, p. 94.
† H. A. Reyburn, *The Ethical Theory of Hegel*, 1921, p. 151.
‡ *Ib.*, pp. 151–52.
§ B. Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 207.

His. His—to be made ours, when we accept the gift. When we are conscious of having refused the good, by the grace of God, we are rent into a higher and a lower self. And the former, being the reflection of the Holy One in whose image we have been made, stands over against the other and pronounces a judgment that pains us. Dr. Stalker distinguishes the Sequent and the Antecedent conscience; the former contains a retributive element: "No sooner is a decision come to, or a deed done, than there ensues a judgment favourable or adverse, a sentence of guilty or not guilty. . . . In the individual's own breast is, besides, the executioner; because on the back of the sentence of condemnation or acquittal there immediately follows the pain of a wounded or the satisfaction of an approving conscience; and of all human miseries or blisses this is the most poignant."* Our Loving Father sent the pain; and of His grace we can allow the lower self to be pervaded by the higher. Our instincts and impulses have been baptized into Christ and have a purpose in which our self will not be divided, but will be one after the manner of God who is One. He never denies Himself; nor must we. But, having done so, His grace may unify us, if we will it to be so. "The 'new man' is derived directly from the Father in heaven; he is created in Christ Jesus; and the transition from the 'old man' to the new is, at all its stages, referred to the Holy Spirit, working through the agencies which He employs in the Church—the Word, the sacraments, and prayer."† The Moral Order, which is the expression of God's Holiness that we have offended, is restored (retribution); we are reformed; and we are deterred from future transgression. The victim is no mere means only, he is an end also. We may well agree with Professor James Seth that "Christianity has so brought home to us this brighter side of punishment, this beneficent possibility in all suffering, that it seems artificial to separate the retributive from the reformative purpose of punishment."‡

W. C. DE PAULEY.

* *Christian Psychology*, 1914, pp. 240–41. † *Ib.*, p. 252.
‡ *A Study of Ethical Principles*, 1908, p. 323.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

On the subject of the Revised Lectionary and "First Evensong," the Rev. A. E. Alston writes:

"The rubric allows a semblance of 'first evensong' on an ordinary Saturday and on the day before any holy day that hath a vigil or eve. The holy days that have a vigil or even are set forth in the 'Tables and Rules' prefixed to the Book of Common Prayer. The Revised Lectionary, however, ignores the Table and treats all holy days alike, with the exception of Easter, Ash Wednesday, and Good Friday. Of course, the rubric does not apply to Easter, because the even is itself a holy day; but if the Table is to be ignored, and an eve or vigil given to holy days not mentioned therein, why should not Ash Wednesday and Good Friday have 'first evensong,' absurd though it would be? But having superseded the Table of Vigils or Eves, the Revised Lectionary apparently ignores the 'first evensong' of Sunday—that is to say, it provides no lessons to correspond with the collect enjoined by the rubric!

"I hold that 'first evensong' is a mistake, and the rubric a blunder; but the Revised Lectionary is as half-hearted in this matter as were the revisers of 1661."

Canon de Pauley, whose article we publish to-day, is Lecturer in St. John's College, Winnipeg, the Anglican College of Manitoba University.

Mr. R. H. Thouless writes:

"On finding my article on 'Authority in Morals' criticized by Canon Lacey in the December number of Theology, I am more inclined to be content to be grateful for the illumination of the subject by his great scholarship than to attempt a defence of myself. The tendency to which I referred, however, was not to a comfortable persuasion that men should not trouble themselves unnecessarily about their sins, but to a kind of exaggerated horror of evil which expresses itself by a feeling against the instincts themselves—against, for example, the sexual nature itself, and not only against unbridled or misdirected sexuality. I think that something of this tendency, as an attitude if not as a moral doctrine, is to be found in the writings even of St. Augustine himself.

"In speaking of a 'tendency in Christian morals,' I meant what Canon Lacey calls 'loose popular thinking' rather than the statements of theologians. This being the case, I must admit the impropriety of having used the word 'creed,' which suggests a formula promulgated with some kind of authority."

The Service Book of the Eastern Orthodox Church reviewed in our February number is a complete Service Book arranged for the Russians and other Easterns in the United States who are coming to use English as their language. The S.P.C.K. has arranged to be the English publisher, and the price has been fixed at £1.

Professor Hogg, in his book *Redemption from this World*, reviewed by Mr. Mozley in the February number, has a striking thought. He points

out that in space everything influences everything else in a measurable degree. Is it not the same in time? We acknowledge that the past influences the present (cause and effect); why do we refuse to believe that the future equally influences the present? This seems to be an argument for teleology of real value. One would like to see it worked out for Old Testament prophecy.

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the inquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

BOOKS ON CONFESSION

A young priest in the Dominions, living sixty miles from the nearest fellow-priest, asks advice on the best books to study in order to qualify himself for hearing confessions. The inquiry was submitted to two well-known experts, who kindly sent lists of books. Those books which occur in both lists are starred. One referee advises starting on the first two in the list. Three recent books published by S.P.C.K. are given at the end, because besides being useful they are cheap.

* *Some Principles of Moral Theology.* Kirk. Longmans. 15s. (Follows St. Thomas Aquinas in the theory of Christian morals.)

The Moral Theology of the Sacrament of Penance. Williams. Mowbray. 7s. 6d.

(These first two to start on, according to one expert.)

I. Moral Theology: General.

Manuale Theologiae Moralis. Prümmer. 3 vols. Herder. (The best R.C. book on the subject. An abbreviation of the larger work has recently been issued by Messrs. Herder in 1 vol. (10s.), called *Vademecum Theologiæ Moralis.*)

Handbook of Moral Theology. Koch-Preuss. 5 vols. Herder. 7s. per vol. (A good R.C. book written in English and easy to understand.)

Conscience and Christ. Rashdall. Duckworth. 5s. (Valuable for its critical views on present-day morality in its relation to the Christian ethic.)

The Claims of Duty. V. T. K. Brook. Dent. 3s. 6d. (Elementary introduction to general ethics; it is not specifically Christian.)

II. Special. (For use in hearing confessions.)

* *Manual for Confessors.* Belton. Knott. 7s. (A practical guide.)

* *The Cure of Souls.* Webb. Mowbray. 6s. (A sensible book, but rather condensed and somewhat out of date.)

Present-Day Problems in Christian Morals. Belton. Mowbray. 5s. 6d.

Ministry of Absolution. Bickersteth. Longmans. 4s. 6d.

The Priest as Confessor. Baverstock. Cope and Fenwick. 3s.

III. Psychology.

The Machinery of the Mind. Firth. Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d. (Elementary, but very valuable.)

Psycho-analysis. Hingley. Methuen. 6s. (A splendid introduction to the new psychology.)

The Psychology of Insanity. Hart. Cambridge Press. 5s. (Very interesting and illuminating.)

An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion. R. H. Thouless. Cambridge Press. 7s. 6d. (Compact, full, and readable.)

Christian Morals. Humphries. S.P.C.K. 4s. (Written as a textbook for service candidates for Holy Orders. One of the cheapest of the complete books.)

Notes on the Ministry of Reconciliation for Young Missionaries. Callaway. S.P.C.K. 2s. (Bears African conditions in mind primarily, but adaptable to others. Very simple.)

Christian Ethics. Peter Green. S.P.C.K. 2d. (A remarkable twopennyworth.)

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(*a*) 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18: ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ Πνεῦμά ἐστιν· οὗ δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα Κυρίου, ἐλευθερία. . . (*Now the Lord is the Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.*)

Bishop Gore in his latest book, *Belief in Christ*, discusses this passage, of which he gives an unusual interpretation.

Before coming to close quarters with his argument it is only fair to give the Bishop's vigorous protest against the misuse of the passage in modern criticism. On the phrase, "Now the Lord is the Spirit," he writes:

"To say, as 'the critics' are so fond of doing, without more ado, that St. Paul 'identifies' the glorified Christ with the Holy Spirit, on the strength of *one* phrase, while in some thirty passages he distinguishes them, is unreasonable and as far as can be from the spirit of legitimate criticism."

Few will think these words too strong, and I dare say many with myself would wish that the matter had been left there. But, as it is, we must look at the process by which the interpretation is reached, and to do so had best have it in the Bishop's own words:

"The question is whether St. Paul 'identifies' Christ the Lord in heaven with the Holy Spirit. . . . I think it very difficult to suppose this. And the passage seems to me to suggest a quite different interpretation. According to the MSS., it runs (ver. 16), 'But whensoever the children of Israel shall turn to the Lord (referring to Exod. xxxiv. 34), the veil is taken away. Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.' Here the sudden transition from the

Lord who is the Spirit to the Spirit of the Lord, followed by another transition in the next verse back again to 'the Lord the Spirit,' seems to me to be so awkward as to make eminently probable the minute emendation of the text proposed by Dr. Hort . . . according to which we should read, 'Whensoever it shall turn to the Lord, the veil is taken away. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit is Lord, there is liberty. And we all . . . reflecting the glory of the Lord, are being transformed . . . as from the Lord the Spirit.' Here St. Paul no doubt in some sense calls the Spirit the Lord. But I have come to be convinced that it is in this sense: The Lord to whom Israel must turn is the Spirit (*i.e.*, the Holy Spirit now given to the true Israel in the Christian Church). Only where that Spirit is Lord is real liberty, and it is in the power of this Spirit Lord that we Christians are being transformed. It is true that St. Paul does not elsewhere call the Spirit Lord, but I think that he is led to do so here by the suggestion of the narrative in Exodus; and it appears to me that there is no violence or improbability in this supposition—viz., that as St. Paul constantly calls the Father the Lord,* and Jesus Christ the Lord, so once he should have called the Holy Spirit the Lord—for obviously He is Lord in Christian souls in the same sense as the Father and Jesus. This seems to me much more intelligible than that St. Paul should confuse Christ and the Spirit by saying 'the Lord Jesus is the Spirit,' while he elsewhere so clearly and constantly distinguishes them."

The attractiveness of this interpretation cannot be denied: it gives emphasis to the Apostle's previous asseveration that "no one can say Jesus is Lord" but in the Holy Spirit; it has the support of many of the early Greek writers; and it enriches other passages (*e.g.*, 1 Thess. iii. 1 and 2 Thess. iii. 5), where, following St. Basil, we should be justified in assuming that St. Paul there, too, is referring to the Holy Spirit. The temptation to accept it is, therefore, alluring. But closer examination forbids the interpretation.

To begin with, it infringes the principle that the sure word of Scripture must be the final test of any theory: that where our present primary authorities give an undoubted consensus in the text we may not go behind it. Granted that here the smallest emendation possible is all that is sought, is it not weakening our strongest position if we allow ourselves any dispensation in this matter? At a time when the very foundations of our religion are being attacked by means of "arbitrary rejection of well authenticated texts" we cannot afford to deviate one hair's breadth from this safeguard.

Apart from that, there seems to me to be a serious objection to the proposed emendation, though with the weight of Dr. Hort's authority behind it. As we all know, κύριος is the word used throughout the LXX. for the Divine Name, and it is so taken over into the New Testament. Now, according to Trommius, the word in the LXX. is always substantive; it is not once used as an adjective. But that is what this emendation requires, and remembering St. Paul's intense reverence for the Divine Name I cannot believe that he would have used the word κύριον here.

* Exception may be taken to this. St. Paul never, I believe, says "the Father is Lord," as he says Jesus is Lord and the Spirit is Lord. His invariable name for the Father is Θεός as Κύριος for Christ. However often—certainly not always—we may refer Κύριος in quotations from the LXX. to the Father that is an entirely different matter.

Other considerations raise obstacles to its acceptance. While this small section in a long paragraph (iii. 2 to iv. 7 in W. and H.) is made to run smoothly and consistently to itself, it is at the expense of the whole paragraph, and to my mind leads to actual contradictions on St. Paul's part, as well as more startling transitions. In the first section (vers. 2-16) our Lord Christ is the central figure. In the second (17-18) the Holy Spirit takes His place. Then in the closing section Christ comes back as the subject. So, too, in the second the "glory" is that of the Holy Spirit, whereas in the third it is that of Christ. Nor should it be overlooked that while Bishop Gore is fully entitled to translate *κατοπτριζόμενοι* by "reflecting"; the word of A.V. "beholding"* is, I believe, the primary meaning, and is so understood by all the Greek writers, St. Basil going so far as to speak of the soul "gazing on the glory of the Spirit." Once again, St. Paul, after saying "the Lord is the Spirit," asserts only a few sentences further down that "we preach Christ Jesus as Lord."

When we turn to the First Epistle we find ourselves face to face with similar difficulties. Only a few months have elapsed since it was written, and St. Paul shows clearly that he expects his readers to have that in their minds in reading this. There he had told them that "to us there is one God the Father . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ." This Christ he has assured them has become "a life-giving Spirit" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*); here he says that "they are an Epistle of Christ," while the letters written on their hearts by the Spirit of the living God are "life-giving" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ*). With all this before us, can we believe that St. Paul would thus abruptly break off to emphasize the Lordship of the Holy Spirit?

In clinging to the old interpretation, we may go still further and risk a conjecture as to the source of St. Paul's phrase, "The Lord is the Spirit." Is it not quite possible that he has in his mind some words of the LXX.? I am, of course, referring to Lam. iv. 20, which there runs, *πνεῦμα προσώπου ἡμῶν χριστὸς κύριος συνελήφθη*. Now it matters not at all that these words, translated straight from the Hebrew, give (R.V.) "The breath of our nostrils, the anointed of the Lord" (*i.e.*, Zedekiah), nor that, *for us*, they are utterly inapplicable to our Blessed Lord. What does concern us is the fact that from the earliest times they appear to have been seized upon by Christian writers and applied to Him. There is something very striking in the way in which we come upon it everywhere in any writer, Greek or Latin, when treating of the Holy Spirit, and with many of whom, if I remember rightly, it becomes the direct statement, "The Spirit of our countenance is the Lord Christ." And the grotesque use made of it by Justin Martyr and the way in which a Bishop writing in the Far East (Aphrahat, A.D. 327) denounces the popular use of it suggest that it became the common property of the Church, and would certainly have found a place in Dr. Rendell Harris's *Book of Testimonies*, if such a work ever existed. Remembering, then, the prominent place that *πρόσωπον* has in the mind of St. Paul throughout (it is successively the face of Moses, of children of Israel, of the Christian, and finally of Christ), it is not fantastic, I hope, to suggest that it is this phrase in the LXX. which leads St. Paul to say, "Now the Lord is the Spirit."

This, I admit, transfers the charge of "identifying" the Lord Christ

* Which requires, I suppose, the "glory" to be here that of Christ as below (iv. 5). Latin *speculantes*, always.

from St. Paul to the Church at large. But that I reckon a pure gain. For if it can be shown that it is unreasonable to charge this against St. Paul *in the sense of confusing them*, still more is it so with the Church itself. I say "in the sense of confusing them," for I think that in this passage St. Paul does "identify" the Lord Christ with the Holy Spirit, and that right down to our own time orthodox writers on the doctrine of the ever Blessed Trinity, as well as commentators on the Bible, tacitly, at least, have so accepted the words, without in any way either having in their own minds or imputing to his *confusion* of the two Persons.*

In conclusion, I would plead that a simple explanation can cover what on the surface is so perplexing. Is it not evident that St. Paul is here—as not unfrequently—giving utterance to a brilliant analogy that has leapt into his mind before he has worked it out adequately in detail? Dr. Garvie,† who sides with the Bishop on the main point, seems to me on sure ground when he writes that "St. Paul . . . writes as though the distinction between the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit were for him not definitely fixed."

But much more than that. Here, as always, St. Paul's own experience comes in and lies behind the written words. Thus what appears as a general statement is in reality definite and emphatic in his own mind. He had turned to the Lord Jesus as Messiah at Damascus, and the veil was taken away. He saw now, what the Lord Himself had taught His disciples, that all was "according to the Scriptures." But this discovery he knew well was not his own, but, being "in Christ," the working of the Holy Spirit. And in this overwhelming inrush of light and power into his soul the two, the glorified Christ "Who is life-giving Spirit" and the Spirit Who is "life-giving," are *practically* indistinguishable. That, however awkwardly expressed on my part, is, I believe, a fundamental truth, and would be the testimony of all Saints from St. Paul's day to this.

After thus presuming to question the Bishop's exegesis of this particular passage, I may be allowed to close by saying that his book is one to which those who read it will return again and again for both instruction and inspiration.

GERARD BALL.

(*b*) St. Matthew xxviii. 1: ὀψὲ δὲ σαββάτων, τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ εἰς μίαν σαββάτων, ἦλθε Μαρία ἡ Μαγδαληνὴ κ.τ.λ. (A.V.: *In the end of the Sabbath, as it began to dawn towards the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene*, etc. R.V.: *Now late on the Sabbath day, as it began to dawn*, etc.)

This is a well-known crux, the difficulty of which is obscured by A.V. and displayed by R.V. According to R.V. the Evangelist writes nonsense: the women came late on Saturday night (*i.e.*, about 6 p.m.), as the dawn was breaking on Sunday morning—a manifest contradiction. Three explanations are available. The first two are policies of despair, the third is perfectly satisfactory if the words can be translated in the required sense.

I. Matthew is copying from Mark, and condensing the latter's narrative in a manner shown by the following table:

* As, indeed, the Bishop himself, cf. *Ep. to Rom.*, p. 277, "Not to have Christ's Spirit—that is, Himself—dwelling in us, is not to belong to Him."

† *Expositor*, January, 1913, p. 40.

Mark xvi.	Matthew xxviii.
1. And when the Sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James, and Salome, bought spices, that they might come and anoint Him (*i.e.*, they made the purchase on Saturday night, intending to go very early next morning).	1. Now late on the Sabbath (Matthew leaves out the intervening matter because he is abbreviating; perhaps he is influenced by the previous mention of the watch),
2. And very early on the first day of the week they come to the tomb when the sun was risen.	as it began to dawn towards the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene, etc.

I call this an explanation of despair. St. Matthew is a very careful writer, and it is highly unlikely that he allowed an absurd contradiction to stand.

II. ἐπιφώσκειν is used, as in Luke xxiii. 54, of the approach of a new day. The Aramaic word which lies behind it is connected with the word for Venus, and so may denote the coming of either morning or evening according to context. Mark has misunderstood the tradition, and Matthew tacitly corrects him. His meaning is: late on Saturday evening, as the first day of the week began. The conclusion is startling. Matthew puts the Resurrection on Saturday night. This again is surely an explanation of despair, for so wide a divergence from the common tradition is almost incredible.

III. All comes straight if we may translate ὀψὲ σαββάτων "after the Sabbath." This sense of ὀψὲ was common in late Greek. Thus Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius*, iv. 18, ὀψὲ μυστηρίων, "too late for the mysteries"; vi. 10, ὀψὲ τούτων, "after these things." ἐπιφώσκειν will be used of the coming of morning rather than of evening, as in Luke xxii. 54, but there is no difficulty in this, especially if we avail ourselves of the theory as to its Aramaic equivalent. When in doubt consult the Greek commentators, is a sound rule. Now Severus of Antioch (see Cramer's *Catena*) has a lengthy note on this passage, to which insufficient attention has been given. It is customary to say, so he tells us, ὀψὲ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὀψὲ τῆς ὥρας, meaning *after* the time, *after* the hour. So Matthew means *after* the week was over, at the beginning of the next week. The Greek exegetes are far more likely to have understood the subtleties of New Testament language than modern scholars. Further, it may be urged that, if Matthew had perpetrated a glaring contradiction either of himself or of Church tradition, we should expect that an attempt would have been made to revise his text, resulting in textual confusion. But of this there is no sign.

Note.—Is it too bold to question the ordinary translation of *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, vii. 1? The police went out περὶ δείπνου ὥραν, "about supper time," to arrest the saint. καὶ ὀψὲ τῆς ὥρας, "late in the evening," they found him. As the same word is used, may not the second phrase mean "after the hour (of supper)," "when the supper hour was past"? The sense is the same, but ὀψέ would be a preposition rather than an adverb. W. K. L. Clarke.

ON COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Probably all our readers are familiar with the procedure of Committees. The Committee is the modern method of working and has many advantages. But its success depends entirely upon the creation of a common

mind, to which the individuals defer. When every question is pressed to a decision by a show of hands the true Committee atmosphere is lost. The following extract from Dr. Hodgkin's recent book, *The Christian Revolution* (p. 82; The Swarthmore Press, 1923), is instructive. The method is more applicable to a group of like-minded people than to a mixed meeting representing divergent interests. But with modifications it might be employed advantageously in ordinary Church gatherings.

"That small body of Christians (the Society of Friends) has tried to discover the divine will in a type of meeting and discussion that has, until recently, been tried, as far as I can discover, in no other religious community. No votes are taken and no resolutions are moved. Nevertheless decisions are reached, often through very grave differences of opinion. The actual organized life of the whole community has always been carried on in this way, and there is not the least disposition to change it for any "more business-like method," for the simple reason that it works.

"The underlying assumption is that the Spirit of God is a present factor guiding to a right conclusion, that His will may be known if those who gather have patience and mutual forbearance, that as their hearts are turned to Him He will make His presence known and bring order out of disorder, harmony out of divergence. The meeting begins in silence. All hearts are thus turned to God, inward peace is secured, the private judgment is brought into relation to the larger purpose of life. It may be that some words of prayer are heard, but these will be simply the expression of a common aspiration that cannot be kept in, not the set form of prayer or anything that is felt to be 'required' before the meeting can properly begin. The only human guidance comes from a clerk who introduces the subject for discussion and records what he believes to be the judgment or 'weight' of the meeting. There is perfect freedom of discussion for man and woman alike, as they may be led. At such time as he thinks fit the clerk introduces a 'minute' recording the decision. If this is acceptable, as is usually the case, it will be agreed to at once, and the next business will be taken. If some question it, further discussion will be allowed, or time may be given for more silence or for vocal prayer. The minute may not express the views of all, but it will be accepted by all as a record of the meeting's decision, and all will be loyal to it. That is to say, the meeting does not wait for unanimity, but proceeds along the course which seems most strongly supported by 'weight,' which may not always mean majority rule. The assumption that the meeting is under divine leadership is often remarkably confirmed. Many a time, on what seems to be a subject impossible to agree upon, unity is reached. Sometimes a majority will waive a point to a minority, and there will be good feeling all round, when a vote would certainly have left a number of aggrieved persons. The discussion is not an attempt by each party simply to vindicate its own views; it is a common search for truth, which means that one is at least as anxious to find out what is true in another's point of view as to state one's own. The uniting power of silence with a common conviction that the Spirit of God is in the midst and is a unifying influence is sometimes most remarkable. In such a stillness, following a prolonged discussion that seems to 'lead nowhere,' a creative or reconciling thought may be given to some person, and not infrequently to several persons independently. It is scarcely possible to convey the electric impression that sometimes passes through such an associated group during or after such a silence."

REVIEW

BELIEF IN CHRIST. By Charles Gore, D.D. John Murray, London. 1922. 7s. 6d.

DR. GORE'S second volume on "the reconstruction of belief" covers a great deal of ground and bristles with points of controversy. That does not make the reviewer's task easy, especially if, as in the present case, he finds himself in close agreement with the author's main convictions. The interest of an apologetic work, with whose conclusions we are in sympathy, must largely be found in the question of method and of the weapons employed. Whatever verdict may be passed upon these, the Bishop goes far to meet his readers, here as always, by his obvious sincerity, in which there are combined very strong personal conviction and a transparent determination to face all the facts.

The argument of this volume starts from the point to which *Belief in God* carried us—namely, that if we are to have any really adequate belief in God at all, the object of our faith must be the God of the prophets and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Christian revelation succeeded to an earlier dispensation. The Jewish background is, then, of first importance if the faith of the first disciples is to be rightly understood. For Bishop Gore the Jewish background which matters is primarily the prophetic teaching about God and the Messianic age, and only in a very subordinate sense the ideas of later apocalyptic writers. The Bishop keeps two important points in the foreground of his discussion of the Gospel story: (1) That our Lord went back to the revelation in the prophets and built upon it; (2) that both in His teaching and in His claims there was something profoundly new and original which has no parallel either in Jewish literature or anywhere else. A special chapter is given to the apocalyptic teaching; and here effective use is made of those sayings in which our Lord disclaims knowledge of the last day and hour. The theories of Harnack and Schweitzer, however, are both under a cloud; and the view which is now to be reckoned with is that of Bousset and Lake, who hold that the man Jesus was deified by His disciples under the influence of contemporary mystery cults. In reply to this theory the Bishop makes a close examination of the apostolic writings, and finds in them no trace of any such process of "adoption." It has been claimed that this kind of Christology is to be found in the subapostolic literature. But, as the Bishop points out, when adoptionism was for the first time clearly formulated by Paul of Samosata, it found no popular support at all, and was at

once condemned by the episcopate. The early Christians, in fact, were not learned people occupied in speculations about our Lord's relation to the Godhead. Apart from two or three great men in the apostolic age, they simply did not consider the question at all. There is no room for adoptionism before St. Paul, and no sign of it within the Church afterwards until a much later period.

In the chapters which follow the Bishop makes a persuasive appeal for the acceptance of the Church's estimate of our Lord's Person, together with the system of dogma which this has been seen to involve in the experience of the Church. Here Dr. Rashdall comes in for some severe criticism, which is no more than his due. For some time that distinguished writer has been trying to persuade us that Augustine and Aquinas were really Unitarians. Students of the *De Trinitate* and the *Summa Theologica* have read his remarks with undisguised astonishment; and now to complete our bewilderment we are told that Irenæus and Athanasius were both Apollinarians ! The Bishop has no difficulty in clearing the characters of the two great Western doctors by referring to the text of their writings; while, as to the other charge, it is only an unhistorical mind which could require writers to exhibit the exact language of an age later and more technical than their own. Hardly a single early writer would pass such a test, and the Fourth Gospel would certainly be suspect for its use of σάρξ in i. 14. We must be grateful to Bishop Gore for protesting against this highly sophistical attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the unlearned. The book closes with a plain and reasonable statement about original sin and our need of atonement. To the concluding chapter is appended a very useful note as to the bearing of Copernican astronomy on our belief in the Ascension. It is repeatedly asserted by our modern literalists that certain clauses of the Creed tie us down to pre-Copernican ideas of heaven and earth. The Bishop is able to quote Jerome and Gregory of Nyssa to the contrary with telling effect. The evidence shows that " even when no one doubted the Ptolemaic astronomy, intelligent Christians did not fail to see that heaven and hell were not spatial terms " (p. 321). So that is one more bogey laid.

The method of apologetic employed in this volume and its predecessor is one which has serious and increasing drawbacks. Thus, for example, the Bishop tells us that he reserves all questions of authority for the third volume. But is not this a mistake ? All views are formed on some kind of authority, even when the character of the authority in question is not consciously recognized. Men argue on opposite sides, and will

continue to do so, although the real grounds for their respective points of view are hidden deep down in differences of experience. A certain view of God's nature and the character of His action upon the world will dispose a man to interpret the phenomena of the Gospels in a Catholic sense, and to find himself in accord with the verdicts of ecumenical councils. To another man the whole of this sequence will appear utterly remote and irrational. However ably and persuasively it is presented, the details of the argument will seem to be simply a series of personal judgments, which do not carry conviction because they come from a strange world of experience to which he does not possess the key. The argument, then, surely needs reversing. We have to ask ourselves what are the real grounds on which we continue to accept the Catholic reading of the Gospel. It is not on grounds of historical criticism, where discussion is never closed. Nor is it on the grounds of theism or of the Old Testament revelation, either taken separately or in combination. For the history of thought shows clearly enough that both of these must rely on the assistance of Catholic Christianity for their continued acceptance rather than the reverse. We are driven, then, to conclude that the real starting-point of such an inquiry in the days to come will lie in that field which the Bishop's argument has not yet touched—that is to say, in a searching examination of the constituent elements of the Catholic religious experience. It is there that we shall find an authority for our dogmatic beliefs which can be scientifically justified, so far as the limits of human science allow; for it is in that region that those beliefs actually arise and are sustained.

L. S. Thornton, C.R.

NOTICES

Belief, Faith, and Proof. By the Rev. J. H. Beibitz, with an introduction by Bishop Gore. John Murray. 6s.

This volume is a general defence of theism, Mr. Beibitz's position being that fundamental truths of natural theology have the same position and justification as the fundamental truths of science. "The test of a hypothesis is whether it is capable of giving a coherent and rational explanation of observed facts." This sentence well illustrates his attitude, and he emphasizes the significance of securing co-ordination in a variety of fields. From this point of view he engages in a restatement of the argument *e consensu gentium*, the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the moral argument, and the ontological argument. The book is suggestive and may prove of importance, although in my judgment it will rather be by way of assisting to a better formulation of their case persons who are convinced of theism, and have some knowledge of its grounds, than by being a suitable volume to be placed in the hands either of unbelievers or of persons with very little knowledge of

the philosophy of theism. This limitation arises through the argument being very compressed, and through Mr. Beibitz not being content with a merely superficial treatment, so that he frequently has in mind positions and arguments which would confuse the ordinary unphilosophic reader. Dr. Gore in his introduction expresses regret at the brevity of the book; I venture to hope that his remark may lead Mr. Beibitz to publish somewhat more detailed studies in the same field. In that event, certain points seem to me to deserve special consideration and to be likely to repay further treatment.

Mr. Beibitz, as has been said, treats theism as a hypothesis which finds partial verification in experience, but which in the nature of things never admits of complete demonstration. He draws the parallel between the acceptance of theism as the fundamental assumption of religion and the acceptance of the uniformity of nature as the fundamental assumption of science. He goes on to point out that in the theistic creed there are other factors besides intellect which come into play and produce an inner feeling of certitude which reasoning is powerless to create. It is to be regretted that he has not found space to discuss whether this is not also true in regard to the acceptance of the uniformity of nature, and in general what criteria, if any, exist for determining when such intuitive judgments are likely to be correct. The restatement of the cosmological argument appears to me the least satisfactory chapter in the book, and I doubt whether on the lines along which Mr. Beibitz is working it is capable of almost complete separation from the teleological argument. In regard to the teleological argument itself, I could wish for fuller discussion of the question as to whether any restatement must be based on the appearance in the universe of absolute values, or whether the modern criticisms of Darwinism have not made possible a legitimate restatement of the older form of the argument. We cannot return to Paley, but it is becoming by no means inconceivable that purely biological considerations may demand, as a necessary hypothesis, Design—and a Designer.

WILL SPENS.

RELIGION AND MODERN THOUGHT. By George Galloway, D.Phl, D.D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Divinity, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1922. Price 8s.

Everything written by Principal Galloway is worthy of most earnest attention; he has the characteristics of a great theologian—clearness of thought in all the mazes of the philosophy of religion, breadth of view, critical discernment, and the power of packing a whole point of view into a telling phrase, as when he talks of the " elective affinity " of the Christianity of the first centuries by which it appropriated whatever was akin to itself.

The present book is a collection of articles and addresses mainly on the present aspects of religion and the tasks of modern theology, with such titles as Religious Experience and Theological Development, The Essence of Christianity, Religion and the Supernatural; it includes a masterly essay on Kant's influence on religious thought, and a good paper on National Religion.

The detailed analysis or criticism of any of these papers is impossible here, but certain leading ideas occur again and again in the varying articles, which are the core of the writer's theological position. It is evident that though he cannot present any final programme of the readjustment

of theology to life, yet he has a strong hold of some guiding principles; from the vantage-point of very comprehensive knowledge he can paint the shortcomings of Traditionalism and Modernism, pit Ritschl against Hegel, and Loisy against Harnack, not as an irresponsible critic with no standpoint of his own, but as one very much assured that a Christianity void of certain elements is not Christianity at all.

He has the conviction that religion has its origin in the psychological constitution of man; it is a matter of feeling, cognition, and will from the first to the last, and therefore dogma is the necessary flower from the root of religious feeling. One may exalt "religious values of personal experience," but the Creeds were once "judgments of value"; they were no heathen intruders into the sanctuary, they expressed for the minds that framed them a divine experience. To Dr. Galloway there is a continuity in Christianity; it is one through history, its apparent changes are its reaction to the changing forces of man's developing life and thought; that is why all thinkers have stumbled on the path of the quest of its essence. How can we formulate the essence of a growing and responsive life in the phrase of one phase of thought? Ultimately in no way save as an ideal. Does that mean the Modernism of Loisy? Not at all, says Dr. Galloway, for the historic basis is that from which the whole ideal springs from age to age. The Christian has "a growing vision," but he is united with Christians of other days by certain beliefs, which differentiate the Christian from men of other faiths. Forced after much philosophical discussion to put down definitely what these essentials are, the writer claims that they are no theological abstractions, but very simple Gospel truths: first, the centrality of Christ; second, the assurance of Redemption; and third, the transcendent aspect of the faith, its anchorage in a "Beyond," its innate distaste—that is to say, to regard the Kingdom of God as merely a bettering of the conditions of life here. This is a simple conclusion, and who would guess the mental labour that justifies it to the philosophical mind, the rejected simplifications that are not simplifications, the human wisdom met and countered in fair argument, and all the forms of speculative inquiry considered?

Dr. Galloway is convinced that a readjustment of doctrine to modern life must come; its aim must be the discrimination between essential and non-essential, and a general simplification. With regard to the first, time slowly does it of itself, wearing away the unnecessary and outworn; but the Church must not forget to register the work of time, when time has done right.

W. J. Ferrar.

Select Epistles of St. Cyprian, treating of the Episcopate. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by T. A. Lacey, M.A. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d. net.

There are at least two translations of St. Cyprian's Letters, but Canon Lacey has done well to give us this selection of those of prime importance for the history of the episcopate; the translation here given, that done in 1717 by Nathaniel Marshall, "rector of St. Vedast in the City of London," if hardly suggesting the original and requiring on occasions the present editor's corrective and pruning hand, is a vigorous and eminently readable piece of English. The footnotes provided by the editor are judicious and useful, and constitute no small portion of the value of this handy and commendable work. The Introduction

(xlii pages) gives a full and interesting account of Cyprian's life and activities; the section on his episcopal theory is good as far as it goes, but it deserved more than the two and a half pages assigned it. Naturally, on ground so often worked over and so controversial, Canon Lacey's position will not meet with unanimous agreement, but his conclusions are well considered and vigorously defended. P. xxviii, the famous passage *Petri cathedra atque ecclesia principalis, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est* (*Ep.* 59, 10) is taken as "cited, not without some touch of irony, perhaps from the very letter *a schismaticis et profanis* carried by Felicissimus to Rome"; p. xxxi, *Ep.* 67 is put after Easter, *Ep.* 68 before Easter, 254; p. xlii, the interpolation in the *de Unitate* is briefly discussed, the opinion given in the author's *Unity and Schism*, p. 168 ff., being followed, that both texts are from Cyprian's own hand, one the original, read probably in the Council of Carthage, anno 251, the other substituted by him in a later edition. A reference at this point to other discussions of this difficult question would have been welcome. "The Chronology of St. Cyprian" is given according to Pearson's *Annales Cyprianici*, but the footnotes of the editor are quite insufficient to show how very controversial many of these are and how far they have been modified by modern research. P. viii, note, for "Jerome, *Ep.* 84," read "*Ep.* 70, 5," and correct the quotation by the Vienna edition of Hilberg; p. ix, note 2, correct "lxxiii" to "lxiii"; p. xiv, note, the correct spelling is Oxyrhynchus. A Scripture index would have been of use; references to earlier studies in English (Dodwell, Sage, Benson, and others) might not be superfluous. As it is, this little work should be in the hands of all interested in the early history of the episcopate, supplying as it does much useful information in small and manageable compass. It gives an opportunity of studying the sources themselves, which is always infinitely more valuable than reading books about the sources; our thanks are due to Canon Lacey for putting these before us in so neat and readable a form.

J. H. Baxter.

Personal Immortality. By A. G. James. Student Christian Movement, 1922. Pp. 148. 3s. 6d.

We imagine that the authorities of the Student Christian Movement know their own clientele. It would, therefore, appear that there are a large number of boys and girls, particularly in the new universities, disposed to be somewhat patronizingly interested in Christianity who have grown up in almost complete ignorance of even the more elementary portions of the Church's teaching. To them Mr. James's book will doubtless be of interest, and we are therefore glad that it has been written. If it induce any members of the S.C.M. to recognize that there may be more to be learned about Christian orthodoxy than is already familiar to them it will have served a useful purpose.

The author's general standpoint is indicated by a remark on p. 144: "Of all the contributions that were made by Jesus to the thinking of mankind, by far the most important was His revelation of the Fatherhood of God." We think that we have encountered a somewhat similar opinion in the writings of Professor Harnack! The reader's estimate of the permanent value of Mr. James's book will be deeply influenced by whether he accept or reject this assertion.

MIRACLES AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. By E. R. Micklem. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.

This little book (it is only 140 pages) is expensive, but should not be missed. Mr. Micklem has made a preliminary study of the healing miracles of the New Testament in the light of modern psychotherapy. This branch of science is so young and progressive that he would be the first to disclaim any very permanent value for his book; before very long it is sure to be superseded by a fuller treatment based on greater knowledge. But for the present it holds the field.

The modern cures cited are all drawn from ordinary medical literature, and no use is made of those into which any religious element has entered. The introductory sketch of psychotherapy takes us rather far afield—for instance, into the cure of warts, which are peculiarly susceptible to mental treatment—but every example prepares the way for something in the later part of the book. The methods employed for healing are (1) the hypnotic trance; (2) a "hypnoidal" state, in which the patient does not lose consciousness; (3) persuasion; (4) psycho-analysis. These methods are not mutually exclusive; in each suggestion is involved. ("Suggestion," according to Dr. Hadfield, "is the process by which ideas are introduced into the mind of a subject without being submitted to his critical judgment.") Mr. Micklem thinks that though no one supposes Our Lord to have used hypnotic processes, yet the various methods are so closely connected that it is legitimate to use modern hypnotic cures in illustration of the Gospel miracles. Auto-suggestion is probably the proximate cause always, and it may be induced in different ways. There are many recent examples of collective treatment; indeed, the healing of crowds rather than individuals in the Gospels presents no difficulties.

We cannot follow Mr. Micklem in his detailed examination of the miracles. His treatment of the woman with a hæmorrhage who touched Our Lord in the crowd is typical; instances are given proving that complaints of this kind are peculiarly susceptible to mental treatment. On the vexed question whether organic disease is curable by psychotherapy the writer remarks that, "according to the profession, a disease which has been cured by psychotherapy alone must be *eo ipso* a functional disease."

W. K. L. CLARKE.

BOOK NOTES

The Christian Doctrine of Peace. By James Hastings, D.D. T. and T. Clark. 8s.

This is a scissors and paste book, but very different from many to which the term would be appropriate. The master-mind which planned the great dictionaries has left us as his posthumous gift this beautiful collection of all that master-minds have said about Peace—Christian peace, not as the world gives it—and War. The treasures of a vast library have been ransacked and displayed in such a way that preachers can use them to help their congregations. If there is one part of the book which we read with more gratitude than the rest, it is the section which dares to reprint what men told of the horrors of war. For we have looked away from the war long enough. The time has come to look it in the face once more, and meditate on its horrors, so that our wills may be strengthened to banish it for ever from civilized mankind.

In the House of My Pilgrimage (Longmans, 4s.) is a tiny book of poems by a nun, largely concerned with South Africa. Father Congreve appreciated them highly, and his letters of commendation appear in a preface. The first lines in the book strike a note that is sustained throughout:

> When my feet, their last steps sped,
> Lie so still upon my bed
> I shall care that Thy Feet bled.

Some Pamphlets, etc.

The Liverpool Diocesan Board of Divinity issues two new numbers: Canon A. W. Robinson's *The Trend of Thought in Contemporary Philosophy* (Longmans, 1s.) is necessarily sketchy owing to the limitations imposed on a single lecture, but it certainly succeeds in awaking in the reader a sense of what he misses by the neglect of philosophy. Lotze, Boutroux, James Ward, William James, Eucken, and Bergson are claimed as representatives of a trend of thought favourable to religion. Canon Storr's little book on *The Being of God* (Longmans, 1s. 6d.) contains three lectures, on Rival Conceptions of God, Divine Personality, and Creation and its Implications. Few books of its compass could treat a difficult subject so successfully. Every page is within the comprehension of an educated reader without philosophical training, and yet there is no writing down. Canon Storr is especially informing when he shows us that there is personality in God, but that He is not a Person. Mr. M. F. Bell's *Church Music*, familiar to many in the "Arts of the Church" Series, reappears in a still more charming garb (Mowbray, 3s. 6d). There are many guides to Church music, but for convenience of reference, good value for the money, and a sense of the limitations imposed by the conditions of the ordinary parish, this is hard to beat. Canon Deane's *Questioning Christ* (Mowbray, 2s. 6d.) contains eight sermons which, if not out of the ordinary in other respects, are models of simplicity in treatment and a dignified and graceful English style.

A Grammar of Belief.—By C. L. Dibble. Mowbray. 6s. 6d.

This charmingly got-up American book is one of a series intended as a basis for discussions by students in colleges. A group of clergymen of the American Episcopal Church who are engaged in academic work act as sponsors. The author, described on the title-page as "attorney at law," is an exceptionally well-qualified layman, who has read the best books especially in the fields of religious psychology and philosophy, and knows how to set forth his knowledge in an attractive form. The book is really a manual of Christian evidences from the Church standpoint and can be confidently recommended.

Bilychnis: Rivista Mensile di Studi Religiosi. Rome. L.3.

Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review. Dublin. 3s. 6d.

Two contemporaries deserve a brief notice. "Bilychnis" is the origin of the Italian Baptists; it certainly is a noteworthy production. The main features of the November number are articles on the Shepherd of Hermas, and on a Catholic Reformer; accounts of the last Congress of Philosophy at Oxford and of the Reform movement in the Greek Church; reviews of books in Italian, French, German, and English; and a section entitled "Per la cultura dell' anima," which this month consists of an Italian version of Tertullian's *Testimony of the Soul.* The same publish-

ing house announces two other papers, "Conscientia," and "Il Testimonio," and a new series of small books styled "Quaderni di Bilychnis." Twelve volumes are published or in preparation. They deal with a variety of subjects, including Fr. Tyrrell, Amiel, the origins of Luther's system, Proclus, Mazzini, the Greek view of life, and an Italian version of the Epistles of St. Ignatius. It would be interesting to know whether the funds for this propaganda are provided from Italian sources. In any case, those responsible are to be congratulated on their breadth of outlook and sympathetic attitude towards Catholicism.

"Studies" has established itself as an Irish review which is becoming indispensable for those who would keep in touch with the new Ireland. The December number is remarkable for its aloofness from England. There are two articles dealing with Irish subjects, two with American, one each with Australian, French, Hungarian, Polish, Spanish, Czech, and German subjects. One only has any immediate connection with England, and that deals with Belloc and Chesterton as writers. The new Ireland here depicted is cultivating relations with the rest of the civilized world, and as far as possible ignoring England. Fr. Corcoran's account of Irish secondary education is good reading. A vigorous attempt is being made to break away from the English tradition of classical education, and to substitute a conception of Latin as a living language. The whole number is interesting. Some of the writers display a contemptuous indifference towards England, which, we trust, will wear off. Writers of equal calibre in England are neither contemptuous of nor indifferent to Ireland. The movement which aims to create in Ireland an indigenous culture, with its direct lines of communication with the Continent, deserves the respectful sympathy of Englishmen.

In His Will. By the Bishop of Zanzibar. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

The main thought of these rather formless but most beautiful and helpful Retreat Addresses is the identity for all practical purposes of God's will or providence and Jesus. We are not to think of God's will as an iron law, but as a living and loving Person. The theological implications are not quite clear, but the book is entirely on the devotional plane, and controversy does not arise. The book can be strongly recommended for use in a private retreat. A typical quotation shows its quality.

"Prayer is filial waiting upon our Father. If I say that my prayer is a lifting up of my heart unto God, I shall speak the exact truth in the sense I should like to use it, but it is a phrase open to danger. Lifting the heart unto God is exactly what I mean by waiting upon the Father; if we remember that Love is a Person and that my love is my person. A person uplifted to a Person, that is all right, but if the uplifting of the heart is supposed to be a sentimental feeling or emotion, then we get wrong in our definitions. Call it a filial waiting upon God our Father: that is the essential thing in prayer, in our relation to God Who is Love. . . . We go to our prayers not pretending we have brought anything to the Father; we dare not ask selfishly from Him; but we simply yield ourselves to the movement of the Spirit which is carrying us all back into the heart of Jesus, into the Bosom of the Father" (p. 147).

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